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The U.S. Army is beginning to field the first of six
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) and equip the organic
Anti-Tank (AT) Company of the Brigade with the LAV III
Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Platform and the Tube-
Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided 2B (TOW 2B)
missile system. A developmental effort is currently
underway to replace the aging TOW 2B and Hellfire missile
systems with a common missile that meets both ground and
air requirements.  With increased range, lethality, and
target acquisition capability, the Common Missile (CM) is
being designed as the primary weapon system for the Army’s
Comanche helicopter and is a candidate for the lethality
system of the Future Combat System (FCS) within the Army’s
Objective Force.  Additionally, the CM is designed to be
“backwards compatible” with existing TOW 2B and Hellfire
launch platforms.  The objective of this research effort is
to determine the increase in operational effectiveness
through the employment of the CM in the AT company of the
SBCT in three different scenarios, using the high-
resolution Janus Combat Model.  Operational effectiveness
will be assessed and statistically analyzed using
lethality, survivability, and engagement range for three
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The United States (U.S.) Army is undergoing a
significant transformation from its traditional Cold War
organization and equipment to a lighter, more strategically
responsive force.  Over the next five to ten years, the
Army plans to form brigade combat teams that combine the
capabilities of both light and heavy forces, while also
maintaining and modernizing legacy heavy forces.  During
the interim phase of the Army’s Transformation, six Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), formerly referred to as
Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTS), will be formed and
equipped with a family of medium-weight armored vehicles.
During the first two phases, the Army will continue to both
modernize and re-capitalize current equipment and
simultaneously invest in the new technologies required to
create the objective force.  Concurrently, the Army plans
to design and establish a new Objective Force to replace
both the legacy forces and interim brigades.  The Objective
Force will operate under newly defined warfighting doctrine
and will be equipped with the Future Combat System (FCS)
that maximizes available state-of-the-art technology.  The
transformation will have far-reaching implications upon
force structure, systems acquisition, training, logistics,
information technology, and the way the Army fights in the
21st Century. (Both of the terms “IBCT” and “SBCT” will be
used interchangeably throughout this document, as a
function of the chronological development of the brigade.)
[Ref. 4]
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Each SBCT possesses an organic anti-tank (AT) company,
which will be equipped with the Light Armored Vehicle III
(LAV III) platform and armed with the Tube-Launched,
Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided 2B (TOW 2B) missile system. 
The primary mission of this company is to provide accurate,
long-range anti-armor fire support for the brigade in
offensive, defensive, and small-scale contingency (SSC)
operations.  With its standoff capability and high
strategic and tactical mobility, this platform operates as
either an organic company with three platoons, or task-
organizes by platoon to support the three infantry
battalions within the SBCT.
In order to address the dramatically declining
availability of TOW 2B and Hellfire missiles due to their
expiring shelf-lives, the Army is investing in the
development and procurement of a common missile system that
meets both ground and air requirements.  A missile system
that is common between air and ground forces will result in
benefits in the areas of logistics, common launcher
interface, common storage and maintainability requirements,
and overall reduction in life cycle costs in contrast to
procuring both air and ground capabilities separately.  It
is being designed as the primary weapon system for the
Army’s Comanche helicopter and a candidate for the
lethality system for the FCS within the Objective Force. 
Additionally, the Common Missile (CM) is designed to be
“backwards compatible” with existing TOW 2B and Hellfire
launch platforms.
Throughout the past two decades, the two primary means
of defeating enemy armor has been either with direct fire
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tank ammunition or anti-tank missiles.  The M1 Abrams tank
fires primarily kinetic energy (KE) ammunition to defeat
enemy armor.  KE rounds are characterized by a long sub-
caliber depleted uranium penetrator that is fin-stabilized. 
Once the round is fired it travels at supersonic speed, and
upon hitting the target, the penetrator rod concentrates an
extremely high amount of kinetic energy over a small
surface area of the target.  This high energy enables the
KE round to penetrate even the most formidable armor. 
[Ref. 13] 
In anti-tank missiles such as the TOW 2B, a shaped
charge is used in the warhead to defeat enemy armor.  This
type of warhead is basically a cone-shaped hollow liner
made up of a metal material such as aluminum or copper. 
The back, or hollow side, of the liner consists of the
explosive material.  Once the warhead strikes a target, a
fuze detonates the explosive, causing the metal liner to
become partially molten, with the rest of the cone forming
a metal slug that penetrates the target.  Advances in armor
protection such as explosive reactive armor (ERA) have a
demonstrated capability of defeating both KE and shaped
charged warheads by firing an explosive charge outward from
the target platform, defeating the incoming projectile. 
Advanced missile warheads can now defeat ERA through the
use of a precursor or tandem warhead, which serves to pre-
detonate the reactive armor, allowing the main warhead to
penetrate the target.  The CM is proposed to be an advanced
chemical energy missile with a shaped charge, multi-mode
warhead, capable of defeating a wide array of threats.
[Ref. 12]
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This study will employ the Janus Combat model to
determine if a significant increase in operational
effectiveness is gained through the employment of the CM
within the AT company of the SBCT.  This comparative
analysis will use the LAV III ATGM platform and TOW 2B
missile system as the base case, with the LAV III and CM
system as the alternate case. (The term “LAV III ATGM
platform” and “Stryker ATGM platform” will be used
interchangeably throughout this document due to the Army
naming of the platform as “Stryker” in February 2002.)

A.  THESIS PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the
differences in the operational effectiveness between the CM
and the TOW 2B missile system when employed by the Stryker
ATGM platform within the SBCT.  Currently, the Stryker ATGM
platform is being produced and fielded to the SBCT on the
LAV III platform with a TOW 2B and an Improved Target
Acquisition Sight (ITAS) capability.  The CM program is
currently being developed as a multi-purpose, combined arms
missile.  Envisioned as an Objective Force system, the CM
is also viewed to be a potential risk mitigator to the
aging stockpile of TOW and Hellfire missile systems; this
is especially applicable to the IAV ATGM system within the
SBCTs.  Within this research effort, the primary focus will
concentrate on the modeling and simulation of the tactics
and techniques of the SBCT AT Company, establishing and
inputting realistic parameters of both systems within
Janus, developing three operational scenarios reflective of
the Operational and Organizational (O&O) employment of the
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unit, executing the simulations, and conducting statistical
analysis of the results.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
Within the context of the Stryker ATGM platform in a
Janus simulation, which missile system provides the most
operational effectiveness?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
• How did the variation of terrain between
scenarios affect the performance of the missile
systems?
• What are the specific advantages of employing the
CM system rather than the TOW 2B within the SBCT
AT company?

C.  RESEARCH SCOPE
The scope of this research will include a review of
the Operational and Organizational (O&O) plan for the SBCT,
an in-depth review of the operational requirements for the
Stryker ATGM platform, a review of the doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures for the SBCT AT Company, a study
on the capabilities and tutorial of the Janus Combat Model,
and the development of three tactical scenarios for the
simulation runs.  The TOW 2B simulations will be designated
the base case, while the CM simulations designated the
alternate case.  Each scenario for each case will be run in
Janus twenty-five times, so that a total of 150 runs will
be conducted.  The thesis will conclude with a comparative






The research methodology for this thesis followed five
steps:  literature review, Janus tutorial, Janus scenario
and model development, simulation execution, and data
collection, synthesis, and analysis.
The literature review and background research began
with reviewing all current documentation on Army
Transformation and the continuing development of the SBCTs. 
Coordination with combat developers from the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was conducted to
review the most current documentation on the stand-up of
the SBCTs and the fielding of the Stryker ATGM platform. 
Concurrently, both the CM Project Office and the Close
Combat Missile Systems (CCMS) office of PEO Tactical
Missiles provided information on the respective
capabilities of the CM and TOW 2B missile systems.  Lastly,
a thorough review of the O&O concept and emerging doctrine
for the SBCT and AT company was conducted to provide the
basis for tactical scenario development.
The Janus tutorial and subsequent scenario development
and execution was performed at the TRADOC Analysis Center
(TRAC) – Monterey, located at the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS).  The Janus User Guide and tutorial documentation
were reviewed to provide a baseline understanding of the
Janus model, and to learn how to input the necessary data
to develop the three scenarios.
Designing the scenario encompassed inputting and
reviewing the attributes for the applicable weapon systems,
developing the tactical scenarios in accordance with the
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doctrine of the SBCT and AT company, and incorporating the
force structure and scenarios on the different terrain
locations.  A run matrix was developed and used to record
the results of each simulation run.  
The next step, simulation execution, encompassed
running all of the iterations per the run matrix.  Each
scenario for each weapon system was run twenty-five times
to provide the fundamental data for the statistical
analysis.
Lastly, the data collection, synthesis, and analysis
step consisted of collecting the data from each run,
developing graphical spreadsheets, and reviewing the
results from the subsequent statistical analysis.  These
results were synthesized into conclusions that answered the
primary and subsidiary research question, provided insights
into the operational effectiveness of each missile system,
and led to recommendations for further research.

E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The thesis is comprised of six chapters.  Chapter I,
Introduction, provides the framework for the study and the
methodologies employed to develop the simulation and
conduct the analysis.
Chapter II, Background, provides an overview of Army
Transformation, the SBCT, the AT Company, the Stryker ATGM
platform, the TOW 2B, and the CM.  The purpose of this
chapter is to present the capabilities of each organization
and weapon system to establish the underpinnings for the
scenario development.
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Chapter III, Janus Overview, describes the model and
scenario development process, execution of the simulation,
an overview of each of the three scenarios, and a
definition of the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).
Chapter IV, Data Presentation and Methodology; and
Chapter V, Data Analysis; present the data and the
statistical analysis techniques used to compare the results
for each system from each scenario.  The data is
graphically depicted in spreadsheets for each MOE, while
the analysis comparatively examines the statistical
differences.
Chapter VI, Conclusions and Recommendations, draws and
summarizes the conclusions from the statistical analysis,
thus answering the research questions.  Potential areas for
further research are also listed, and include a short
description for each.

F. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THIS THESIS
This study is intended to provide the CM Project
Office and Program Manager (PM), Brigade Combat Team (BCT),
with insights into the potential for increased operational
effectiveness of the SBCT if it were to be equipped with
the CM.  It will also provide lessons learned for the
employment of the SBCT AT Company based upon emerging
doctrine.  Lastly, the results will provide both the
Program Executive Office (PEO) for Tactical Missiles and
the Department of the Army (DA) with additional




A.  ARMY TRANSFORMATION OVERVIEW
The demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s
initiated unprecedented changes for the United States Army. 
Instead of the traditional monolithic threat to prepare
for, the Army was called upon to conduct a series of
deployments in response to several regional or contingency
threats.  With the exception of Desert Storm, the
deployments to Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, from the
late-1980s to the mid-1990s, can be characterized as Small
Scale Contingencies (SSCs). This type of operation requires
some scale of combat forces to stabilize or contain a
regional crisis, until the situation can be downgraded to a
stability and support operation (SASO).  The next level of
conflict is termed a major regional crisis (MRC), and is
represented by potential challenges from adversaries such
as Iraq, Iran, or China. [Ref. 25: p. 2]  The final stage
of conflict is referred to as a major theater of war (MTW),
and is characterized as the “most serious conventional
military scenario the United States would have to face.”
[Ref 25: p. 2]  The National Military Strategy (NMS) of
1997 states that the U.S. must be capable of responding to
all types of potential environments ranging from
“…humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning major
theater wars, and conducting concurrent smaller-scale
contingencies…” [Ref. 25: Ch. II, p. 1]  To meet the
requirements of the NMS, the two concepts of strategic
agility and power projection are required.  With the
downsizing of the military, the U.S. must have the
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capability to rapidly deploy forces from the continental
United States (CONUS) in order to respond effectively to
SSCs.  Based on the legacy forces of the M1 series Abrams
tank, the M2/M3 Bradley Infantry/Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
(BFV/CFV), and the M109A6 Paladin artillery system, it
became clear that the heavy forces of the Army are
incapable of rapid power projection from CONUS, thus
requiring a new way of thinking and a new type of force to
resolve this deficiency.
In October 1999, General (GEN) Eric K. Shinseki, the
Chief of Staff for the Army (CSA), unveiled his vision for
Army Transformation at the annual convention of the
Association of the United States Army (AUSA) in Washington,
D.C.  In that speech, GEN Shinseki described his Vision for
the Army, which encompasses transformation, readiness, and
people.  Within this Army Vision, GEN Shinseki’s intent for
Army Transformation was described as follows:
Heavy forces must be more strategically
deployable and more agile with a smaller
logistical footprint, and light forces must be
more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.
Achieving this paradigm will require innovative
thinking about structure, modernization efforts
and spending. [Ref. 40: p. 2]
With the theme of “Soldiers on point for the nation –
persuasive in peace, invincible in war,” the goal of the
Army Vision is to achieve “strategic dominance across the
entire spectrum of operations.” [Ref. 32] The Vision
stresses the need for land forces in joint, combined, and
multi-national operational structures and environments. 
Additionally, the Army must possess the necessary
responsiveness, and strategic and tactical dominance to
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train for and execute operations in missions ranging from
humanitarian operations, to SASO operations, to SSCs, to
MTWs.  To meet the requirement for full spectrum dominance,
the CSA outlined seven key characteristics in the Army
Vision that the Army must possess:
• Responsiveness – Strategic responsiveness through
forward deployed forces, forward positioned
capabilities, and force projection capabilities.
• Deployability – Capability to deploy a combat
force anywhere in the world within 96 hours.
• Agility – Capability to transition rapidly from
SASO to MTW and back, as necessary.
• Versatility – Capability for organizational
forces to seamlessly task organize to maximize
force effectiveness for the mission at hand.
• Lethality – Includes the traditional elements of
fires, maneuver, leadership, and protection. 
Army Transformation will focus on retaining the
lethality of heavy forces while improving
deployability, as well as retaining the
deployability of light forces while improving
lethality.
• Survivability – Must leverage technology to
provide maximum protection to soldiers, both
mounted and dismounted.
• Sustainability – Must aggressively reduce the
logistics footprint of our forces. [Ref. 32]
During the initial phase of Army Transformation, which
is currently ongoing and will continue through 2003, two
SBCTs are being organized, equipped, trained, and tested. 
In the interim phase, an additional four SBCTs will be
formed and equipped with a family of medium-weight IAVs,
now called the “Stryker.” [Ref. 39]  During these first two
phases, the Army will continue to modernize and re-
capitalize current equipment and concurrently invest in the
 11
new technologies required to develop and eventually field
the Objective Force.  The final phase of Army
Transformation will be the transition to the Objective
Force.  In this phase, the entire Army will be organized
into new organizations and equipped with new technologies,
which the Army intends to come to fruition within the next
10 to 15 years.
The initial phase of the transformation is currently
underway at Fort Lewis, Washington, where the Army is
organizing, equipping, and training the first two SBCTs. 
The core forces for these two brigades are a heavy
mechanized brigade of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division and a
light infantry brigade of the Army’s 25th Infantry Division. 
Extensive cross-leveling of personnel and equipment,
conversions of military occupational specialties, and
training at all levels have taken place to facilitate the
initial stand-up of the brigades.  In July 2001, the Army
announced in the following statement the identity of the
next brigades to transform:
The next brigades to transform, in order, are the
172nd Infantry Brigade (Separate), Forts
Wainwright and Richardson, Alaska; the 2nd
Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, La.;
the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light),
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the 56th Brigade
of the 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
Pennsylvania Army National Guard. [Ref. 41]
The Army evaluated candidate vehicle prototypes,
referred to as bid samples, throughout the month of June
2000.  A six-year, $4 billion contract was awarded to
General Motors/General Dynamics Land Systems Limited
Liability Corporation (GM/GDLS LLC) on 17 November 2000 for
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2,131 LAV IIIs. [Ref. 30]  The two initial SBCTs are
serving as the operational and organizational models for
the follow-on SBCTs, using medium-weight vehicles on loan
from Canada and other countries.  
Throughout the initial phase of Army Transformation,
the Army will continue to revise key concepts, doctrine,
and strategic plans for the SBCTs and continue to refine
the organizational and operational design for a new
divisional structure.  The Army will also address
interoperability issues between the Services and other
nations, as well as the transformation efforts of the Army
Reserve Component and the Army’s institutional force.  A
key milestone for this phase is Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, at
which time the first SBCT is scheduled to reach its Initial
Operational Capability (IOC).  Prior to this milestone, the
initial brigade will undergo operational testing and
evaluation to validate its operational and organizational
concept, ending in a final certification exercise at the
Joint Readiness Training Center. [Ref. 7: p. 47]
In the interim phase, the Army will apply lessons
learned from the initial phase and form one additional
follow-on brigade per year over the next seven years.  One
Army National Guard brigade, the 28th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, will
be converted to the new SBCT design during the interim
phase.   These SBCTs will be equipped with the same family
of vehicles as the initial SBCTs, until the Army is ready
to begin transition to the Objective Force with the
fielding of the FCS.
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The final phase consists of the total transformation
to the Objective Force.  The Objective Force, to be
completely fielded in about 10 to 20 years, will be
designed and equipped as standardized, vehicle-based,
medium-weight brigades.  It will be completed only after
research and development of science and technology advances
make possible the procurement of the FCS necessary to
realize the capabilities required by the Objective Force. 
Three separate research consortia are currently conducting
experimentation and trials using modeling and simulation in
support of Objective Force development.  The Army will
pursue a conditions-based strategy to ensure that
appropriate conditions are met before moving from the
initial phase to the interim and objective phases of the
transformation effort. [Ref. 7: p. 31]

Figure 1.  Army Transformation [Ref. 7]

The Army Vision will be executed in accordance with
the Transformation Campaign Plan as depicted in Figure 1. 
While concurrently maintaining focus on the seven key
characteristics of the Army Vision, the Army will conduct
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its transformation following a three-axis strategy.  The
top axis of Figure 1 represents the focus of the Army
senior leadership to ensure the capability of near-term
warfighting readiness through an aggressive strategy of
recapitalization of our legacy equipment.  The bottom axis
represents the strategy to address the immediate deficiency
of power projection through the fielding of the six SBCTs.
Finally, the middle axis depicts the Army’s commitment
to funding significant research and development efforts in
order to identify, maximize, and implement revolutionary
science and technology solutions in order to develop and
produce the FCS of the Objective Force.  Based on an
accelerated schedule, a Technology Readiness Decision will
be made in FY 2004 in order to select the most advanced
technologies that will support the desired capabilities of
the Objective Force.

B.  STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
Based on the vision, guidance, and intent of the CSA,
each of the proponent schools within TRADOC began to
explore the organizational and operational characteristics
of a medium-weight based force throughout the summer and
fall of 1999.  Leading up to GEN Shinseki’s announcement at
the AUSA convention in October 1999, the Combat Development
(CD) directorates at Fort Knox and Fort Benning, in
conjunction with TRAC-Leavenworth, conducted extensive
modeling and simulation experiments that resulted in the
organizational configuration depicted below in Figure 2. 
The main goal throughout the development of the brigade was
to optimize it for employment in SSCs and, with
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augmentation, employment in MTWs.  To do this, the CD
community realized the need to design the brigade with a
focus on maximizing the force effectiveness qualities of
projection dominance and battlespace dominance.  Projection
dominance is comprised of the characteristics of air
deployability, sustainability, and Manpower and Personnel
Integration (MANPRINT), while battlespace dominance
consists of lethality, survivability, and battlefield
mobility characteristics. [Ref. 40] 
AS OF 28 MAR 02 4
sponsive and deployable
ombat capable – full spectrum
- complements Major Theater War or
Major Regional Conflict capability
- creates new Small Scale Contingency or 
Stability and Support Operations capability
ecision, internetted, combined arms fighting
- enhanced situational understanding
- more access to combat multipliers































rinciple fighting force 
of the IBCTs
erate autonomously 
w/in an IBCT AO or as 
part of any combat Bde
erations executed by 
Infantry companies
 operate in close, 
complex, or urban terrain
rovide all-weather, 
around the clock, 
accurate & timely 
reconnaissance & 
surveillance
econ up to 9 routes, 
conduct surveillance of 





an reinforce infantry 
BN mortars
lace forward, reach 
& anticipatory logistics
rovide distributive and 




an destroy all types of 
enemy armor and many 
field fortifications
rovide ISR analysis 
& integration support
aintains organic 
reach for linkage to 
ARFOR
ovide maneuver 




stablish IBCT C4ISR network
twork management
ange extension of voice/data 
commo


























Figure 2.  IBCT Capabilities [Ref. 21]

The mission of the brigade is as follows:
The brigade deploys very rapidly, executes early
entry, and conducts effective combat operations
immediately on arrival to prevent, contain,
stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping
and decisive operations.  The brigade
participates in Major Theater War (MTW), with
augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component
within a division or corps, in a variety of
possible roles.  The brigade also participates
with appropriate augmentation in Stability and
Support Operations (SASO) as an initial entry
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force and/or as a guarantor to provide security
for stability forces by means of its extensive
combat capabilities. [Ref. 40]
As the mission statement indicates, the SBCT, as a
divisional brigade, is designed to be employed as a full
spectrum force.  With a core quality of high mobility, it
possesses increased strategic, operational, and tactical
mobility through its rapid deployability; the goal is for
this brigade to be deployable anywhere in the world within
96 hours as an early-entry divisional force.  Each Stryker
platform is designed to be transportable by a C-130
aircraft within a theater of operations, and the speed of
the Stryker during execution of land operations will meet
or exceed 40 miles per hour (mph). [Ref. 23]
With three motorized infantry battalions, the SBCT is
infantry-centric.  It is primarily designed to get the
infantry to the fight rapidly, augmented by a robust
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
squadron whose primary purpose is to provide unprecedented
situational awareness.  This capability provides the
maneuver commanders at each echelon the ability to employ
their forces at the time and place of their choosing.  In
addition to the infantry battalions and RSTA squadron,
other major sub-elements include the anti-tank company, an
artillery battalion, an engineer company, a brigade support
battalion, a military intelligence company, a signal
company, and a brigade headquarters company.  Their primary







The AT company of the SBCT is the primary long-range
anti-armor element of the brigade.  It is capable of
conducting full spectrum operations in its anti-tank role,
ranging from SASO to SSC missions.  Within an MTW, the AT
company can effectively support a larger force.  The
mission of the AT company is as follows:
The anti-tank company provides accurate, long-
range anti-armor fire support to enhance the
infantry’s lethality and survivability. [Ref. 40]
The AT company is organized per Figure 3.  With a
total of 51 personnel, it consists of a company
headquarters element and three AT platoons.  The company
headquarters is comprised of the command group, the company
fire support section, and a medic section.  Each of the
three AT platoons is led by a lieutenant responsible for
five NCOs and seven soldiers.
HQ
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Figure 3.  AT Company Organization [Ref. 40]
 18
 The AT company supports the missions of the SBCT
through its ability to achieve and maintain standoff
engagement ranges with the enemy.  As the primary anti-tank
force within the brigade, the AT company can operate either
as a unified company, or it can task organize by AT
platoons and conduct missions with the maneuver battalions. 
The latter capability is an essential component of the SBCT
and required to conduct combined arms operations.  The
company will occupy battle positions for the AT platoons to
occupy and provide overwatch from throughout the area of
operations.  As necessary, the company will refine and
develop these positions in order to develop engagement
areas that optimize the stand-off capabilities of the TOW
2B system.  From these positions, the AT platoons retain
the capability to close with and destroy the enemy, or to
support reconnaissance and surveillance operations of the
RSTA squadron. [Ref. 25: Ch.6]
 In the conduct of offensive operations, the AT company
will serve in an overwatch or support-by-fire role in
support of the maneuver battalion’s operations, protecting
the flanks of the SBCT from ambushes or counter-attacks. 
If assigned to the subordinate maneuver battalion, the AT
platoons will conduct similar type missions when operating
in a pure company organization.  The primary purpose of
offensive operations is to “seek to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative to decisively defeat the enemy.”
[Ref. 19: p. 4-1] Offensive operations also attempt to:
• Disrupt enemy coherence.
• Secure or seize terrain.
• Deny the enemy use of resources.
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• Fix the enemy.
• Gain information.
• Deceive the enemy. [Ref. 19: p. 4-1]
The two main types of offensive operations the AT
company may conduct are the attack, both hasty and
deliberate; and the movement to contact.  Offensive
operations are usually “force-oriented attacks against a
stationary enemy force, force-oriented attacks against a
moving enemy force, or terrain-oriented attacks.” [Ref. 19:
p. 4-11]  Figure 4 depicts the different types of
situations in which the unit will conduct an attack.  The
time available will determine the different types of
attacks available to accomplish the mission in order to
meet the intent of the SBCT commander.

Figure 4.  Continuum of Attacks [Ref. 19: p. 13]

A hasty attack is often used by the AT company based
upon either planning time available or tactical
opportunities.  It may be used to sustain the momentum of
an offensive operation, to regain the initiative, or to
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prevent the enemy from reorganizing and preparing for
future operations.  This type of attack is limited by the
resources that are immediately available.  Because of the
potential for frequent hasty attacks to gain and sustain
momentum, the unit relies upon established standard
operating procedures and battle drills due to the lack of
planning time.  After determining that favorable conditions
exist for a hasty attack, the AT company will establish a
base of fire to suppress the enemy force while concurrently
employing a bounding force to close with and destroy the
enemy.  The platoon leader or commander will simultaneously
employ both their organic long-range fires and available
indirect fires to suppress and/or neutralize the enemy. 
Once the bounding force has reached a position where it
holds the tactical advantage, it will conduct an assault to
destroy any remaining forces. [Ref. 19]
In deliberate attack operations, the AT company or
platoons will normally be employed as part of a larger
force, as this type of attack is conducted against a well-
prepared enemy defense.  The planning time involved for a
deliberate attack allows the enemy to continue to
strengthen its defenses.  Due to the complexity and
synchronization involved, a deliberate attack will employ
all resources available at both the AT company and SBCT
levels.  The AT company will normally be used to establish
long-range suppressive fires as part of the overall attack,
in coordination with indirect fires, maneuver forces, and
mobility/counter-mobility forces.  The critical mission for
the AT company is its support of actions on the objective,
where its long-range fire’s standoff capability provides a
distinct advantage to the SBCT.
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Another type of offensive operation the AT company or
platoons will conduct is the movement to contact.  The AT
company or platoon will normally conduct this type of
operation as part of a larger force.  The purpose of this
operation is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy
when the enemy situation is unclear and other resources are
unavailable.  Certain fundamentals the commander must
observe when conducting this operation include:
• Makes enemy contact with the smallest element
possible.
• Rapidly deploys combat power upon enemy contact.
• Provides all-around security for the unit.
• Supports the higher commander’s concept and
intent. [Ref. 19: p. 4-19]
Two techniques to execute the movement to contact are the
search-and-attack technique and the approach-march
technique.  The search-and-attack technique “uses multiple,
coordinated, small-unit (squad, section, or platoon)
actions to find, fix, and finish the enemy.” [Ref. 19:   
p. 4-19]  The approach-march technique is employed when the
AT company or platoons conduct a movement to contact as
part of a larger force.  The AT unit will be deployed as an
advance, flank, or rear guard for the higher unit, with the
mission of preventing surprise attacks, facilitating the
tactical movement of the larger force, destroying enemy
forces within its capability, and developing the situation
upon enemy contact.
The main purpose of defensive operations is to allow
an organization sufficient time to regroup and reorganize
in order to prepare for and conduct offensive operations. 
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Additional reasons for the conduct of the defense by the AT
company or platoons may be to:
• Gain time.
• Retain key terrain.
• Support other operations.
• Preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly
forces attack him in another.
• Erode enemy forces at a rapid rate while
reinforcing friendly operations. [Ref. 19: p.5-1]
In a defensive operation, the AT company will either
operate as a pure company, in order to maximize the effects
of its long-range fires capability, or task organize by
platoons attached to the maneuver battalions.  Either
organization contributes to the SBCT’s ability to counter
armor threats while in a defensive scenario.  The unit must
recognize and incorporate the characteristics of the
defense in order to successfully plan for and execute
defensive operations.  These characteristics are:
• Preparation – The unit must establish the defense
on the terrain upon which the operation will be
conducted with enough time to prepare positions,
allocate resources, and rehearse the plan.
• Security – When used in a security role, the
missions for the AT company or platoons include
counter-reconnaissance, providing the SBCT early
warning, or harassment of the enemy main body.
• Disruption – The main intent for disruption is to
influence and disturb the enemy’s decision cycle
and synchronization in order to prevent him from
massing against perceived weaknesses in the
defense.
• Mass and Concentration – One of the most critical
characteristics of the defense, “the defender
must concentrate combat power at the decisive
time and place if he is to succeed.” [Ref. 19: 
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p. 5-2]  This may be accomplished through
planning for the element of surprise,
incorporating a counter-attack plan, and
maintaining a reserve force.
• Flexibility – The AT company or platoons must
retain enough flexibility in the defensive plan
in order to react to the enemy’s offensive
thrust, and to counter-attack effectively. 
Planning for primary and supplementary defensive
positions, thorough terrain analysis, and
extensive wargaming of potential enemy courses of
action, will facilitate building flexibility into
the defensive plan. [Ref. 19]
The AT company or platoons will use one of these three
defensive techniques:  defense in sector, defense from a
battle position (BP), or defense on a reverse slope. [Ref.
19: p. 5-12]  A defense in sector is basically a non-linear
defense where the AT company will array its platoons in
depth in their own sectors or in mutually supporting BPs,
per Figure 5.  This type of defense provides great
flexibility for the AT company and platoons to orient on
the enemy’s disposition as retention of key terrain is not
a primary goal.  The AT company and platoons can mass their
fires into one or several engagement areas, or maximize the
stand-off capability and engage the enemy at long-ranges,
attempting to attrite his advance.  It is critical for the
AT company and platoons to optimize the use of primary and
supplementary positions so any one element can avoid being
fixed or bypassed by the enemy.  Each AT platoon will plan
and rehearse displacement to successive BPs in the event of
being bypassed or fixed.  Finally, each AT platoon can
maximize the use of indirect fires, obstacles, and other
available combat multipliers to assist the AT company in
shaping the battlefield.  [Ref. 19: p. 5-13]
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Figure 5.  SBCT Antiarmor Company Defense in Sector, with a
Platoon in a Battle Position. [Ref. 19: p. 5-14]

A defense from a battle position is used when a unit
may or may not be mutually supported by adjacent units. 
For that reason, the AT platoon or company will generally
be located within the BP, with security observation posts
(OPs) deployed to the front, rear, and flanks of the BP. 
The AT company commander or platoon leader will assign
primary sectors of fire from primary positions that are
overlapping completely around the BP.  Alternate,
supplementary, and subsequent positions are also assigned. 
(See Figure 6)  One key tenet of a BP defense is for the AT
company or platoons to retain the element of surprise in
order to maneuver effectively within the BP to maximize the
effects of its fires.  Aggressive counter-reconnaissance
will ensure the element of surprise by limiting the enemy’s
ability to determine the exact location and orientation of
the BPs.  If fighting as a pure company with platoons in
BPs in depth, the AT commander can maximize either the
stand-off range of his weapon systems or mass effects in
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one or several engagement areas.  As with a defense in
sector, the AT company or platoons must plan and rehearse
for withdrawal to successive positions if the enemy should
fix or bypass the BP. [Ref. 19: p. 5-15, 16]

Figure 6.  SBCT Antiarmor Company Defense From Mutually Supporting
Battle Positions [Ref. 19: p. 5-18]

A defense on a reverse slope is defined when, “the
antiarmor company (or platoon) is deployed on terrain that
is masked by the crest of a hill from enemy direct fire and
ground observation.  [Ref. 19: p. 5-16]  Using the crest of
a hill to protect itself from long-range enemy fires or
observation, this type of defense allows the AT company or
platoons the time to improve positions, consolidate, re-
organize, and re-supply its forces; and limit the enemy’s
use of combat multipliers such as aviation, indirect fires,
or target acquisition systems.  It is critical that OPs are
deployed forward of the reverse slope position to provide
early warning of enemy activity.  Deployment of fire
support personnel within the OPs provides the opportunity
 26
to maximize the use of indirect fires before the unit
engages with its organic systems.  Planning for counter-
reconnaissance efforts, obstacle emplacement, and unit
displacement are also key concerns for this type of
defense. [Ref. 19: p. 5-17, 18]
Within the SBCT range of operations that are designed
for employment in complex or urban terrain, the AT company
or platoons supports the brigade through the employment of
its long-range fires capability on major routes throughout
a sector or area of responsibility.  In urban area
operations, the AT company or platoons will support the
maneuver of the infantry and reconnaissance elements with
its ability to destroy deployed enemy armor in cities,
maximizing the stand-off capability of its weapon systems. 
The AT company or platoons will typically establish
blocking positions or attack-by-fire positions to counter
the enemy armor threat in these types of operations.

D. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION FOR THE IAV
When GEN Shinseki assumed the position of Chief of
Staff of the Army in 1999, he subsequently charged TRADOC
as the lead agent for the Army Transformation effort. [Ref.
38: p. 6]  The TRADOC Commander’s responsibilities included
developing the O&O concepts, related doctrine, and
necessary materiel requirements if a materiel solution were
deemed necessary.  Each of the proponents and branches
within TRADOC were tasked to develop separate, yet mutually
supporting, products all coordinated by various
directorates within TRADOC Headquarters (HQ).  The
requirements generation process for the IAV followed a
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different path than most legacy programs that had followed
the traditional process.  
The development of the IBCT O&O was the joint
responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine
(DCSD) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat
Developments (DCSCD) of the TRADOC staff.  Subsequently,
all of the proponents/branches within the TRADOC community
were tasked in September of 1999 to support the effort. 
The mission statement for all of TRADOC in this process was
as follows: 
Develop a medium weight capability using
available systems and technical insertions to
provide an interim solution which allows the Army
to better deal with small scale contingencies
without risk to its primary role to fight and win
major theater wars.  [Ref. 20: p. 14]
To accomplish this mission, the United States Army
Armor Center (USAARMC) at Fort Knox, Kentucky; and the
United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC) at Fort Benning,
Georgia; were primarily tasked to conduct force design
experiments supported by modeling and simulation, and to
develop the optimal medium-weight force to bridge the gap
between the Army’s heavy and light forces.  The modeling
and simulation effort provided the foundation for the force
design and utilized Serbia as the base case, due to its
weak infrastructure, complex and urban terrain, asymmetric
threat, technology base, and historical lessons learned. 
Hundreds of simulation exercises were conducted at USAARMC,
USAIC, and the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. [Ref. 40: p. 12]  The results of those
simulations, coupled with the expertise of combat
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developers throughout TRADOC, became the underpinnings for
the IBCT.  In order to maximize the force effectiveness of
this brigade, projection dominance and battlespace
dominance were identified as two required core
competencies.  Key contributors to force effectiveness
within the competency of projection dominance are air
deployability, sustainability, and MANPRINT.  Battlespace
dominance possesses the key contributors of lethality,
survivability, and battlefield mobility.  These core
competencies and six key contributors would later serve as
the foundation for the IAV ORD requirements. [Ref. 40: p.
14]
The development of the IAV requirements documents was
initiated in late October of 1999, subsequent to the
initiation of the O&O development.  Originally referred to
as the Family of Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV), the
Combined Arms Directorate (CAD) of DCSCD at TRADOC was
charged with the responsibility for developing the
necessary requirements documents.  Working closely with the
O&O writers that were supervising the coordinating effort
at TRADOC, the staff of CAD produced several initial
versions of a MAV Mission Needs Statement (MNS) and
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for each of the
proponents to review and recommend changes.  Initial
versions envisioned seven variants to support the emerging
tenets of the O&O.  These included a troop carrier (for
infantry, engineers, and general cargo), an assault
vehicle, a fire support vehicle, a reconnaissance vehicle,
a medical evacuation/medical treatment vehicle, a command &
control vehicle, and an antitank guided missile vehicle.
[Ref. 24: p. 1]  As the process evolved and further
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revisions were made to support the continuously evolving
O&O, TRADOC eventually assigned various proponent schools
the responsibility for developing the requirements for
certain platforms within the ORD, retaining responsibility
for the MNS, but soliciting proponent input throughout the
process.  In doing so, TRADOC not only retained overall
responsibility for the requirements process and documents,
but also retained responsibility for the base MAV vehicle
requirements.  Based upon traditional proponent
responsibility, USAARMC eventually became responsible for
developing the requirements for the Mobile Gun System (MGS)
(formerly referred to as the assault vehicle), the
Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), and the Commander’s Vehicle
(CV).  USAIC became responsible for developing the
requirements for the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)
(formerly referred to as the troop carrier), the Anti-Tank
Guided Missile platform (ATGM), and the newly-created
Mortar Carrier platform (MC).  Other platforms delegated to
the various proponent branches were: the Fire Support
Vehicle (FSV) to the Artillery Center at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma; the Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) and the Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Vehicle to the
Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) at Fort Leonard,
Missouri; and the Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV) to Fort
Sam Houston, Texas.  Since the TRADOC Mission Statement
mandated developing “…a medium weight capability using
available systems and technical insertions to provide an
interim solution…”, the task to each of the proponents was
to conduct market research and determine what was
commercially-available, off-the-shelf, to support their
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respective functions and emerging mission areas as defined
by the evolving O&O.  
Additionally, each proponent was responsible for
researching and identifying potential pre-planned product
improvements for their respective platforms that could
feasibly be integrated into the off-the-shelf technology of
the base platform at a later date.  Logistics requirements
for the various platforms were conducted by each proponent
school in coordination with the Combined Arms Support
Command (CASCOM) for input into Paragraph 5 of the ORD,
Program Support.  By December 1999, the platform was re-
named the “Interim Armored Vehicle” (IAV) to dispel any
pre-conceived notions about weight, the track vs. wheels
dilemma, and to support the name of the newly designated
“Interim Brigade Combat Teams” (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis,
Washington.  In late December 1999, each proponent was
tasked to conduct a crosswalk of the O&O tenets to their
emerging requirements, ensuring their requirements were
feasible and supported by the appropriate operational
requirements.  This analysis was also supported by the
results of the Platform Performance Demonstration (PPD),
which will be discussed later.  The result of this
evolutionary process was an IAV family that consisted of
two variants:  the ICV and the MGS.  The ICV variant became
the key platform for a total of nine configurations,
including the ATGM.
With each of these requirements allocated between the
proponents and the TRADOC staff, the following table









IAV Base ORD TRADOC Common base vehicle
requirements
Annex A USAIC Infantry Carrier Vehicle
Annex A, App. 1 USAIC Mortar Carrier
Annex A, App. 2 USAIC ATGM Vehicle
Annex A, App. 3 USAARMC Reconnaissance Vehicle
Annex A, App. 4 Ft. Sill Fire Support Vehicle
Annex A, App. 5 MANSCEN Engineer Squad Vehicle
Annex A, App. 6 USAARMC Commander’s Vehicle
Annex A, App. 7 Ft. Sam
Houston
Medical Evacuation Vehicle 
Annex A, App. 8 MANSCEN NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle
Annex B USAARMC Mobile Gun System
Annex D TRADOC Common Preplanned Product
Improvements (P3I)
Annex D, App. 3 USAIC ATGM P3I Requirements
Annex D, App. 4 USAARMC Reconnaissance Vehicle P3I
Requirements
Annex D, App. 5 Ft. Sill Fire Support Vehicle P3I
Requirements
Annex D, App. 8 Ft. Sam
Houston
Medical Evacuation Vehicle P3I
Requirements
Annex D, App. 9 MANSCEN NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle P3I
Requirements
Annex D, App. 10 USAARMC MGS P3I Requirements 

Table 1.   IAV ORD Responsible Agencies

Several concurrent activities took place throughout
the fall of 1999 that centered on the early involvement of
the acquisition community.  The Program Management Office
for IBCT supported the development and review of
requirements at the TRADOC level.  Additionally, the PM
hosted an Advanced Planning Briefing for Industry (APBI) in
Detroit, Michigan on 1 December 1999.   By 31 January 2000,
the IAV MNS and ORD was completed and approved at the
TRADOC level, and by 6 March 2000, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed and approved the IAV MNS
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and ORD and validated the Key Performance Parameters
(KPPs). [Ref. 31]
The PPD was conducted at Fort Knox from 05 December
1999 through 20 January 2000.  The purpose of this
demonstration was to educate the Army leadership on the
current capabilities of off-the-shelf medium-weight
platforms, and to demonstrate those capabilities so that
lessons learned could be incorporated into the IAV ORD
development process.  One other critical component of the
PPD was the examination of each vehicle for potential
technology insertions, in accordance with the mission
statement for TRADOC, and to assist in developing the pre-
planned product improvements (P3I) requirements for each
platform of the IAV family.  Seven total countries
participated voluntarily in the PPD, contributing 35
vehicles that represented 11 different defense contractors. 
The PPD was divided into the following five phases:
• Phase I – (Planning phase) Army crews consisting
of master gunners and drivers were trained at
contractor locations on their respective
vehicles.
• Phase II – (Reception, Staging, and Integration
Phase) Contractors and their platforms arrived at
Fort Knox.  Additional crew training and risk
assessments were conducted.  Evaluations for
MANPRINT and technology insertions were
conducted.
• Phase III – (Deployability Phase) Each of the
platforms were measured, weighed, and loaded
aboard C-130 aircraft, rail cars, and Heavy
Equipment Transport Systems (HETs).
• Phase IV – (Demonstration Phase) Each platform
conducted rigorous on/off road driving courses,
day/night live firing, a tactical situational
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exercise, and a platform swim exercise (if so
capable).
• Phase V – (Information Phase) – Written reports
of observations were completed and provided to
the Army leadership and the respective platform
contractors. [Ref. 2: p. 1-2]
The PPD was not intended to serve as the sole basis
for procurement decisions; instead it both displayed to the
Army what types of technologies and platforms were
currently available off-the-shelf, and assisted in the
further refinement of the IAV requirements process.  This
market survey greatly facilitated that effort, and
concluded as a safe, informative event.
The base vehicle requirements are characterized by
strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities.  With a
KPP of transportability by C-130 aircraft, the IAV
satisfies the gap between heavy and light forces in terms
of power projection.  The other KPP for the entire platform
is its planned interoperability with all planned and
existing Army command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems.  This capability will enable the SBCT to maximize
the use of the Army’s emerging digital communications
architectures and systems within the Army Battle Command
System (ABCS).  Other important requirements for the entire
family include a hard surface speed of 40 MPH, all-around
protection from 7.62mm ammunition, and the capability to
add on scaleable armor for protection from 14.5mm rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs) should the enemy situation and
capabilities dictate.  All of the base vehicle requirements
for the IAV family are summarized in Appendix A, part A.
 34
The ATGM platform is a unique configuration of the ICV
variant.  Key requirements for the ICV include a KPP to
carry an infantry squad of nine personnel, the requirement
for armament to defeat enemy troops and light armored
vehicles out to 1500m, and the capability to integrate
mission equipment packages for specific configurations. 
The ATGM’s requirements are based upon the ICV, with the
requirement to integrate the TOW 2B missile system with an
IBAS/ITAS capability.  It must also be able to carry a
minimum of two missiles that are ready to fire at all
times, store a total of eight missiles on the platform,
minimize crew exposure during missile re-load periods, and
manned by a crew of four personnel.  Both the ICV and ATGM
requirements are completely summarized in Appendix A, parts
B and C.
On 17 November 2001, the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA
(ALT)), the Honorable Mr. Paul Hoeper, and the Military
Deputy to the ASA (ALT), LTG Paul J. Kern; announced the
award of the IAV contract to General Motors/General
Dynamics Land Systems Limited Liability Corporation
(GM/GDLS, LLC) for 2,131 LAV III platforms.  Stating that
this platform was, “…the best off-the-shelf equipment
available in the world in this class,” Mr. Hoeper asserted
that this platform would allow soldiers to, “…get to the
fight quickly, win decisively, and come back alive.” [Ref.
29: p. 1]  LTG Kern reviewed several key characteristics
for the LAV III that included 14.5mm armor piercing all
around protection, C-130 transportability, 60 MPH sustained
speeds, low sustainment costs, remote weapon station
capability, and maintainability. (See Figure 7)  LTG Kern
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also discussed each platform within the IAV family, and
acknowledged that the ATGM, NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle, and
the MGS would require developmental work that would take
approximately two years.  He also stated that the 2,131
platforms would be bought incrementally over six years
through a requirements-type contract, not a multi-year
contract, with the first contract awarded for 360 platforms
at a cost of $580 million.  [Ref. 29]

Figure 7.  LAV III Characteristics [Ref. 29]

In February 2002, the Army named the LAV III platform
the “Stryker” to honor two posthumously-awarded Army
Congressional Medal of Honor recipients.  PFC Stuart
Stryker was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving with
the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment near Wesel, Germany,
in WWII.  He is credited with leading an attack that
resulted in 200 enemy soldiers being captured, as well as
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the rescue of three American pilots.  While serving with
the 1st Infantry Division near Loc Ninh, Vietnam, SPC Robert
F. Stryker received the Medal of Honor for saving the lives
of his fellow soldiers.  According to Sergeant Major of the
Army Jack Tilley, “...both made the ultimate sacrifice for
their country and their fellow soldiers.” [Ref. 39]  On 12
April 2002, the Army accepted its first Stryker Interim
Armored Vehicle in a rollout ceremony at Anniston Army
Depot, Alabama. [Ref. 3]

E. TOW 2B
Introduced to the U.S. Army in 1970, the M220 TOW
missile system is designed to “attack and defeat tanks and
other armored vehicles.” [Ref. 33: p. 1]  As a line-of-
sight, wire-guided heavy antitank system, it can be used in
a dismounted capability by infantry soldiers, fired from
the Army’s High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV), the Bradley Infantry/Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
(BFV/CFV) and is also fired from attack helicopters.  It is
capable of penetrating up to 30 inches of armor at ranges
up to 3,750 meters. [Ref. 33]  The TOW weapon system
consists of a reusable launcher, a missile guidance set,
and a day/night sight system.  Managed by the Program
Executive Office – Tactical Missiles (PEO-TM) in
Huntsville, Alabama; the TOW program is currently in the
sustainment phase.  There are five versions of the TOW




Table 2.   Characteristics of the TOW Missile Family [Ref. 33]

Primarily developed by Hughes Aircraft Company, the
TOW system is combat-tested, having served in Vietnam and
the Middle East.  Over 500,000 TOWs have been built and it
is believed to be the most “widely distributed anti-tank
guided missile in the world…” [Ref. 33: p. 1]  The TOW 2
launcher is the most current version and is compatible with
all TOW missiles.  The Improved Target Acquisition System
(ITAS) is a 2d generation forward-looking infrared system
(FLIR) with digital components and an eye-safe laser
rangefinder.  It was designed to significantly improve the
target acquisition capability of the TOW system, and
increase the engagement ranges of all TOW missile
configurations.  
Developed by Raytheon Missile Systems, the TOW 2B
missile is capable of being fired from the BFV/CFV, the
HMMWV, and dismounted, and is optimized for primary use
against tanks.  As the fifth generation, and most modern
and capable missile of the TOW family, it “flies over the
target and uses a laser profilometer magnetic sensor to
detect and fire two downward-directed, explosively formed
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penetrator warheads into the target.”  [Ref. 15: p. 46] 
(See Figure 8) It actually follows a missile flight path
that is slightly offset to the gunner’s aim point.  It was
first fielded to both light and heavy Army units in 1991,
and reached an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 1993. 
The last TOW 2B missile produced for U.S. forces was in
July 1997. [Ref. 15: p. 46]  The TOW 2B missile system is
designed to be integrated with the Stryker ATGM platform
and to serve as the SBCT’s primary long-range anti-tank
fires capability.  (See Appendix A, Part C) 

Figure 8.  TOW 2B Diagram [Ref. 37] 

F. COMMON MISSILE
One of the emerging technologies to improve the
lethality of the Objective Force is the Common Missile
(CM).  This program is designed to develop a single missile
system that is employable on both existing and future
rotary and fixed wing aircraft.  It will be the primary
weapon system on the Comanche helicopter, and is a
lethality candidate for Objective Force ground platforms. 
It also has the capability to mitigate the risk of
declining missile stockpiles for our legacy ground
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platforms.  The United States Navy, United States Marine
Corps, and the United Kingdom are currently participating
in the program. 
The requirement for a Common Missile stems from the
results of a Strategic Planning Review completed in 1998 by
the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Tactical Missiles. 
The PEO chartered a panel of “Greybeards” to focus on six
issues concerning current and future Army missile
development.  In Charter Issue 6, “Identify technologies
required to bridge PEO Tactical Missiles into the AAN [Army
After Next] and those technologies that would form new
systems in the AAN” [Ref. 36, Introduction], their findings
were, “the panel recommends the development of a common
missile to replace HELLFIRE, [HELLFIRE] Longbow, and FOTT
[Follow-On to TOW], placing first priority on meeting
lethality, survivability, mobility and sustainment
requirements and second priority on designing the systems
to meet legacy platform constraints.” [Ref. 36: p. 40] 
This Strategic Planning Review highlighted the growing
concern over the shelf life and projected inventories of
the TOW 2A, TOW 2B and Hellfire missiles.  By FY 2010, it
is projected that only 22% of the TOW inventory will exist,
to be followed by 12% in FY 2011.  Additionally, 100% of
the TOW 2A/B and Hellfire will be beyond their designated












































FY99  FY01 FY03 FY05 FY07 FY09 FY11 FY13 FY15 FY17 FY19 
TOW 
TOW 




FY99  FY01 FY03 FY05 FY07 FY09 FY11 FY13 FY15 FY17 FY19 
Figure 9.  Decreasing Missile Stockpiles [Ref. 6: p. 2]

In 2000, and in the face of budget reductions and
reduced world-wide threats, the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) expressed concern over the number of anti-
tank programs, saying:
The Committee questions the need to procure so
many tank killing systems in a period in which
our potential adversaries possess significantly
smaller tank forces…The Committee believes the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff must do a better job in reviewing these
programs to preserve resources for other
priorities. [Ref. 35, p. 4]
The following year, while reviewing the Common Missile
program, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
expressed support for the program saying:
The Committee understands that the Army is
considering moving toward a “common” chemical
energy missile in the future and that Modernized
Hellfire is intended to be the baseline program
to achieve this worthy goal.  The Army is
encouraged to provide a “Common Missiles” program
funding line in the next budget submission. [Ref.
35]
Lastly, the Authorization Committee synthesized
Congressional support in 2001 with the following statement:
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The conferees fully support the Army’s goal to
reduce the different types of anti-tank missile
systems in its future tactical inventory… 
Furthermore, the conferees expect the Army to
begin funding this effort in the fiscal year 2002
budget submission. [Ref. 35]
The overall goal of the Common Missile program is to
develop a missile capability that meets the aviation
community requirements. The Common Missile will also
support Army Transformation to the Objective Force through:  
• Operational Flexibility
• Multi-Platform Capability
• Reduced Logistics Footprint
• Increased Missile Inventory
• Maintain Overmatch Lethality
• Increased Range
• Enhanced Countermeasures Capability [Ref. 6: p.9]
To support both existing and future air and ground
platforms and systems, the CM will leverage heavily from
existing technological capabilities, as well as take full
advantage of Horizontal Technology Insertion (HTI)
throughout the production process by following an
evolutionary acquisition strategy.  HTI is the application
of common technology across multiple systems, resulting in
an increase in overall force effectiveness and potential
reduction of total ownership cost.  The evolutionary
acquisition strategy will allow the initial capability to
provide an immediate improvement over existing missile
systems, while incorporating and maintaining program
flexibility focused on time-phased requirements.  While
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still in development, the main unclassified operational
requirements include the following [Ref. 6: p. 10]:
• Defeat latest armored threat, engage critical
high value targets
• Tri-mode seeker (Imaging infrared (I2R), semi-
active laser (SAL), and millimeter wave (MMW)) 
• Counter active protective system
• Day/night adverse weather
• Fire & Forget and alternate mode precision hit
• Overmatch lethality
• Increased standoff range
• Resistant to Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)
As an advanced chemical energy missile, the CM is
designed to defeat a wide range of targets on today’s
battlefield.  It will be able to continuously engage
targets through a “fire-and-forget” capability, and a lock-
on-after-launch capability at an envisioned 10-12 KM range. 
The multi-mode warhead will be an advanced chemical energy
shaped charge with precursor(s) in order to defeat modern
reactive armor.  The missile will possess a six-inch
diameter, be no longer than 50 feet in length, and weigh












Figure 10.   CM Concept Drawing [Ref. 6]

To meet the requirements of Army Transformation and to
address the pending shortfalls in the current inventory of
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missiles, PEO Tactical Missiles has proposed an
evolutionary acquisition strategy that maximizes
competition and minimizes cost.  The goal is to procure
73,000 missiles with production beginning in FY 2007 and
continuing through FY 2023. First Unit Equipped (FUE) is
scheduled for FY 2008.  The proposed strategy per phase is
outlined below and in Figure 11:
• System Definition and Risk Reduction Program, FY
2001-FY 2003 – The primary purpose of this phase
is to complete and refine the operational
requirements, facilitate the design and
development of proposed missile concepts, assess
and mitigate risk, and evaluate a Proof-of-
Principle missile system. 
• System Development and Demonstration, FY 2004-FY
2006 – The current strategy is to down-select to
one contractor for this phase.  The contractor
will be responsible to establish a 2d source for
the multi-mode seeker.  
• Production and Deployment, FY 2007-FY 2023 – A
determination will be made on establishing a
leader-follower for full rate production. 
Technology insertion will be used to meet future










LLTI 1 SPIRAL 1
LRIP 2
LLTI 2 SPIRAL 1
LRIP 3
LLTI 3 SPIRAL 1 / 2





FUE SPIRAL 2F/A-18 FUEAPACHE FUE
• POM 04-09
- FUE Accelerated from FY10 to FY08
- SDD fully Funded FY04 - $186.9M, FY05 - $186M, and FY06 - $151.3M
• Spiral 1 Equals Block I Threshold KPP Requirements
• Contractors Allowed to Conduct Requirements Trades to Meet 36 Month Schedule
- Must Achieve Apache and F/A-18 FUE in FY08
• Spiral #2 Equals All Block I Requirements
• Second Source Tri-Mode Seeker

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11





























A. JANUS BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
The simulation used for this research was the Janus
interactive wargaming simulation.  The specific version
resident at TRAC-Monterey is Janus v7.06D.  The “D” refers
to the Distribute Interactive Simulation interface that
enables Janus to interact with other simulations.  Janus
was named after the Roman god known as the guardian of the
gates of Rome who is two-faced and looks in opposite
directions.  He is the patron of the world’s past and
future due to his ability to look in two directions at the
same time. [Ref. 9: p. 1-1]  The basic characteristics of
the Janus model are as follows:
• Interactive – Refers to the real-time interaction
of the personnel commanding the operation within
the simulation, the tactical decisions they make,
and the units/equipment within their command.
• Six-sided – Refers to the ability of the
simulation to represent up to six friendly and/or
enemy forces.  Within this simulation, two
opposing sides are represented.
• Closed – This characteristic describes the lack
of complete, or perfect, information the opposing
forces have on each other.
• Stochastic – This is the methodology the model
uses to determine battlefield outcomes according
to the laws of probability.  These outcomes
cannot be pre-determined.
• Ground combat – Refers to the primary focus of
the Janus simulation on the tactical employment
of ground combat units and systems in relation to
potential battlefield effects.  These effects,
any of which may be incorporated into the
simulation, are combat support and combat service
support systems, terrain, weather, battlefield
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obscuration, day or night operations, and NBC
environments. [Ref. 9: p. 2-1]
Janus will model ground combat simulations through the
brigade level, controlled by respective players on opposing
sides.  The high-resolution color graphics displays
representations that include terrain features, contour
lines, roads, rivers, buildings, and railroad tracks, all
of which may impact the maneuver of systems and deployment
of units. [Ref. 9: p. 2-1]
Ground combat forces may engage in direct fire
engagements when they are within a specified range of each
other.  Based upon previously established database inputs,
Janus will assess these and other factors such as range,
firer motion/direction, and target motion/direction to
determine the outcome.  The database inputs include
parameters such as probability of hit and probability of a
kill, given a hit.  Physical constraints such as available
ammunition, out of range, or target suppression may prevent
an engagement.  Other tactical factors such as a weapons
clearance status, rule of engagement, and other available
priority targets may also affect whether or not an
engagement occurs.  [Ref. 9: p. 2-2]  
Vehicles may use prepared fighting positions (referred
to as PREPOS by Janus) to provide protection from opposing
ground combat systems.  Three protective postures that may
be employed are fully exposed, partial defilade in which
the hull of the vehicle is protected, or full defilade
where the both the hull and turret of a vehicle are
protected.  The user may manually select these postures
during scenario execution.  If a vehicle is in full
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defilade, enemy ground forces will not be able to detect it
until they are within 50 meters.  Vehicles conducting
tactical movement are displayed as fully exposed, but may
go into partial defilade at specified periods as defined by
the user. [Ref. 9: p. 2-4]
The user can establish engagement areas to designate a
specific area in which forces may engage each other.  These
designated areas may prevent fratricide between different
forces of the same side.  This allows the user to establish
a defensive position apart from the designated engagement
area, maximizing the features of available terrain to
establish PREPOS and coordinating fire control measures to
maximize the effects of direct and indirect fire systems.
The terrain used in the Janus simulation is “digitized
terrain elevation data developed by the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA).” [Ref. 9: p. 2-5]  Using the
Terrain Editor feature in Janus, terrain features including
contour lines, urban areas, rivers, and roads may be
digitized from a 1:50,000 map, and highlighted with
different colors.
Target acquisition is a critical dimension in
simulating combat scenarios.  Janus uses two factors to
assess line-of-sight (LOS).  One is the ability for the
firer to actually observe the target based upon terrain or
man-made structures.  The second is the capabilities of the
sensor on the observing platform, and how it may be
impacted at that point in time by battlefield conditions
such as smoke, dust, or atmospheric conditions.  Janus
computes a cumulative probability for LOS (PLOS) along each
terrain grid cell between the target and the firer.  If
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there are no impediments, the probability for that cell
will be 1.0.  After it checks each terrain grid cell and
multiplies the cumulative probabilities, Janus will
determine if LOS exists; i.e. the PLOS must be greater than
.01.  Through data provided by the Night Vision and Electro
Optics Directorate (NVEOD), of the U.S. Army
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) in Fort A.P.
Hill, Virginia; Janus also assesses other optical and
thermal characteristics such as field of view, spectral
band, and thermal temperature. [Ref. 9: p. 2-7]
Units in Janus may maneuver based upon system
capabilities, terrain factors, and battlefield effects. 
During scenario development and execution, movement routes
may be established to control movement and synchronize
operations.  Pre-determined halts may also be established
along these routes based upon location or scenario time. 
This capability is especially critical for synchronizing
offensive movement and operations. [Ref. 9: p. 2-7]

B. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Scenario development or creation within Janus is
defined as:
 …selecting specific systems and weapons,
terrain, force structures, and battlefield
conditions to be represented in the scenario;
designating the initial location of those systems
and weapons on the battlefield terrain; and the
creation and placement of command and control
overlays. [Ref. 9: p. 2-15]
Once a scenario has been created or developed, it can be
saved so that the file may be used again.  Additionally,
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the scenario can also be run, or executed, after the
development process is complete.  The development process
typically follows a nine-step procedure as summarized
below:
• Use the Terrain Editor (TED) to create or modify
the terrain file used in the scenario.
• Use the Symbols Editor (SYMBOLS) to create or
modify the friendly force (Blue) and enemy force
(Red) symbols to be used in the scenario.
• Use the Combat Systems Data Editor (CSDATA) to
input and review the performance characteristics
of the weapon systems used in the scenario.
• Use the Scenario Forces Editor (FORCE) to create
the military force organization used in the
scenario.  This organization is maintained in the
Force File.
• Use the Command and Control Overlay Editor (COED)
to draw tactical control measures on the terrain
either prior to or during scenario execution.
• To create new scenarios or modify old ones,
scenarios may be merged.
• Verify the accuracy and completeness of the
weapons and systems performance data by using the
two Janus verification programs, the Tabular
Verification program (VFYSCEN), and the Graphic
Verification program (GRAFVFY).
• Execute the scenario.
• Review and analyze the results of the scenario
execution using the following programs: Post
Processing Reports (POSTP), Janus Analyst
Workstation (JAAWS), or Janus Plan View Display
(JANPVD). [Ref. 9: p. 2-14, 15]
Once completely developed and verified, the scenario
is ready for execution.  Scenarios may be executed with
either player intervention or non-intervention.  If
intervention is desired, players may completely interact
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with systems and forces throughout the execution of the
scenario by changing unit movement routes, deployment, and
reaction to enemy contact.  Non-intervention is
traditionally used when the scenarios are executed
repeatedly to produce a suitable amount of data for
statistical analysis.  The results for each run are stored
in sequential files for further analysis.  
1. Janus Model Inputs
In order to conduct the simulations required for this
research project, several components of data were required
to be inputted into the Janus model.  Due to prior research
conducted by TRAC-Monterey and other NPS thesis students,
many of the system’s data have already been created within
the Janus database, specifically the TOW 2B and the CM. 
Coordination with the CM Project Office and PEO-TM resulted
in adapting the two weapon systems to the LAV III platform,
as well as the development of the three scenarios used for
this study.  Additionally, TRAC-White Sands Missile Range
(WSMR) provided the necessary icons to represent the
Stryker ATGM platform, and two of the three terrain files
used in two scenarios.  The Combat Systems Database of the
Janus model includes components for system level data,
weapons systems, chemical, engineer, and weather.  For the
purposes of this project, data was either copied from
existing files or inputted at the system, weapons, and
sensor level components of the database.  Appendix B lists





2. LAV III ATGM Platform Inputs
The LAV III ATGM platform was required to be created
within the Combat Systems Database of the Janus model. 
Using data provided by PEO-TM and the IAV ORD, this
platform was created to serve as the base vehicle in each
of the scenarios.  Within the systems characteristics of
the database, all of the platforms unclassified operational
characteristics were inputted.  These included the system’s
speed, weapons range, height, and basic load of ammunition.  
3. Weapon System Inputs
The TOW 2B and the CM are the weapon system variables
that were compared as the base and alternates cases within
each of the three scenarios.  Each weapon system already
existed within the Combat Systems Database of the Janus
model at TRAC-Monterey, but the characteristics of both
were verified with PEO-TM for completeness and accuracy.  
For each weapon system, specific data elements that
must be defined and inputted include:
• Weapon number/name – Each weapon number is given
a number between 1-400 and up to a nine-character
name.  
• Lay time - Average time, in seconds, required to
point or lay the weapon system in the direction
of the target.
• Aim time - Average time, in seconds, required to
aim the weapon once laid in the direction of the
target.    
• Reload time – Average time, in seconds, to reload
the weapon after all ammunition has been
expended.
• Rounds per trigger pull – The number of times the
weapon system will fire one round of ammunition
once the trigger has been pulled/depressed.
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• Trigger pulls/reload – The number of times the
trigger may be pulled/depressed before the weapon
system must be reloaded.
• Round speed – The average velocity of the round
of ammunition, expressed in kilometers per
second.
• Minimum single-shot kill probability (SSKP) –
This is the minimum probability, expressed in
hundredths that one shot will result in one kill. 
If the model determines that an engagement will
not meet the minimum SSKP, then the system will
not fire. [Ref. 8]
The Round Guidance criteria determine how the weapon
system guides a missile to its intended target.  This
includes whether or not the missile requires guidance until
impact, whether or not it can fire on the move, and the
capabilities of the on-board sensor.  One critical
difference between the TOW 2B and the CM is in this area
because the TOW 2B requires wire-carried guidance and thus
may not move until target impact.  The CM may move prior to
target impact due to its “fire-and-forget” capability. 
Another critical difference is in each weapon system’s
range.  The TOW 2B was modeled at an effective range of 3.5
KM, while the CM was modeled at 7.0 KM.  Additionally, the
CM has an organic thermal sensor that provides for
increased target detection.
The Janus documentation defines the probabilities of
hit (PH) as, “the probabilities that a single round fired
by a given weapon at a given range will result in a hit.”
[Ref. 8: p. 4-9]  Concurrently, the probability of a kill
(PK) is defined as, “the probability that, given a hit by a
particular weapon on a particular target, the target will
be killed.” [Ref. 8: p. 4-11] These probabilities are
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maintained within Janus in probability data set tables, and
are associated with each weapon system in the Combat
Systems Database.  Unclassified PH/PK probabilities were
provided by PEO-TM and inputted for both the TOW 2B and CM
weapon systems, and are provided in Appendix B.
4. Sensor System Inputs
The Sensor Section of the Combat Systems Database in
Janus supports direct fire optical and thermal sensors. 
Since both the TOW 2B and the CM are designed to employ
ITAS, and this capability is a requirement on the Stryker
AT platform, the data elements for their respective on-
board sensor capability was the same for both weapon
systems.  One specific limitation of the Janus model is its
inability to replicate the capabilities of the tri-mode
seeker in simulations.  To account for this limitation, a
thermal seeker capability resident in the sensor database
was incorporated into the CM weapon system, but this
parameter is currently not established within the Janus
model. [Ref. 8: p. 4-4]
Other sensor characteristics that must be inputted are
the weapon system’s narrow and wide field of view, the
system’s spectral band capability, the sensor’s resolvable
cycles per milliradian, and the mean values for contrast
and temperature.  All of these data elements were provided
by PEO-TM and are listed in Appendix B for each weapon
system.
5. Janus Model Outputs
Janus records several aspects of data throughout each
run of a simulation.  Results of each run can be replayed
or viewed through the Janus Analyst Workstation (JAAWS), or
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Janus Plan View Display (JANPVD).  The Post Processing
program is used to formulate several different types of
reports to support analysis.  During each run of a
simulation, Janus will record such data as direct fire
shots, movement routes, kills, hits and misses, etc.  To
support the MOEs of lethality, survivability, and
engagement range, two reports were compiled for the 25 runs
in both the base cases and alternate cases to form the
basis for the statistical analysis in Chapter 5.  The
Coroner’s Report depicted the kills made by each side (Blue
and Red) in each run of the simulation and supported the
analysis for MOEs I and II.  It identifies the victim by
name, unit, location, and type of kill.  The killer is
listed with the same information with the addition of the
range at which it killed the victim and the type of weapon
system used.  The second report to be complied and used was
the Engagement Range analysis to support MOE III.  This
report lists each of the Red platforms killed and fired
upon within each run of the simulation, and provides an
average killing range and engagement range by vehicle type
for further analysis.  A sample of each report is provided
in Appendix C. [Ref. 8]

C. RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SENSITIVITIES
For the purpose of modeling and conducting analysis of
the CM and the TOW 2B missile systems within Janus, three
scenarios depicting realistic tactical scenarios were
developed.  As in all modeling and simulation efforts, the
research was subject to certain assumptions, limitations,
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and sensitivities in order to facilitate the research
effort and to conduct the analysis.
1. Assumptions
To effectively measure the capabilities of each
missile system, it was assumed that the Stryker AT company
would conduct operations as a pure company, using only the
three AT platoons.  Each platoon was deployed organically
into battle positions in each scenario, and each vehicle’s
position was enhanced with the ability to fight from a
full-vehicle or partial-vehicle defilade position.  Each
Stryker ATGM platform had the capability to observe
assigned sectors of fire from the full defilade position. 
If a Stryker ATGM platform exhausted its supply of
ammunition, it had the capability to remain in the full
defilade position for the rest of the simulation run.  In
order to accurately meet the requirements for each MOE,
supplementary fighting positions were not incorporated into
scenario development.  Instead, each simulation run was
terminated when either Blue or Red forces were no longer in
a position to engage each other, or either side had been
completely destroyed.  
No other aspect of the SBCT was incorporated into the
three scenarios.  All of the simulation runs were conducted
in ideal weather conditions to facilitate optimal
employment of each weapon system at their maximum
engagement ranges.  No combat multipliers such as indirect
fire support, obscurants, or close air support were
incorporated into the scenarios.  This allowed the research
to focus solely on the performance of each missile system
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without having to account for other systems or
environmental factors.  
2. Limitations
This research effort was limited to the current
capabilities of the Janus program.  For example, while the
CM is proposed to possess a tri-mode seeker capability,
Janus is currently unable to model that aspect of the
missile system.  Another key limitation is that all weapon
parameters inputted into Janus were limited to unclassified
system information for the purpose of keeping this research
effort unclassified.
3. Sensitivities
There were certain sensitivities identified during
scenario development and subsequent test runs.  A key
sensitivity is how the use of prepared vehicle fighting
positions affected MOE II, Survivability.  This area is
subject to sensitivity since survivability is not measured
solely as a function of the Stryker ATGM platform’s armor
protection, but rather as a function of its ability to
optimize the employment of full or partial defilade. 
Another sensitivity identified was the use of inter-
visibility lines in the Janus model.  Inter-visibility
lines limit line-of-sight in what appears to be open
terrain, but is in fact rolling or gently sloping.  While
the terrain depicted is characterized by contour lines at
specified intervals, certain areas that appeared to be open
did not have line-of-sight capability.  This was an
important consideration that was accurately incorporated
into scenario development and the locations selected for
each platoon battle position.  One other sensitivity to be
 58
noted is that the mobility of the Stryker ATGM platform was
not a factor in the analysis of the operational
effectiveness of each missile system, as each scenario
established the SBCT AT company in a defensive situation. 
This optimized the line-of-sight and engagement capability




Three scenarios were created for this study,
incorporating several data aspects as reflected throughout
this study.  Within each scenario, a base case (TOW 2B) and
an alternate case (CM) consisting of 25 runs were
conducted, resulting in 150 runs being conducted in total. 
Each of the terrains selected represent potential real-
world locations to which the SBCT, upon IOC, may be
deployed in the future, based upon recent history or
current events.
The friendly force structure consisted of nine Stryker
ATGM platforms, representing the SBCT AT company.  In the
base cases, the TOW 2B missile system was incorporated on
each platform, while the CM system was incorporated on each
platform in the alternate cases.  The company was deployed
in sector in platoon battle positions consisting of three
Stryker ATGM platforms each.  Each vehicle had the
capability to employ full or partial defilade, depending
upon the threat situation.  Each platoon was deployed upon
the most likely axis of advance of the enemy threat, and
designated with overlapping fields of fire that maximized
each platform’s line-of-sight from that position.  While
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other combat multipliers such as artillery, obstacles,
detailed reconnaissance, and aviation would normally
augment or support the Stryker AT company, all were
excluded to facilitate sole focus and analysis upon the
missile systems being compared. 
While the SBCT is not designed to be employed against
a significant armored threat, one was replicated in this
study for statistical analysis purposes to reflect the
maximum capabilities of both the TOW 2B and the CM weapon
systems.  The threat force used in this study consisted of
a generic opposing force (OPFOR) threat battalion
consisting of two T-72 tank companies and one BMP-2
mechanized infantry company. [Ref. 26]  Each tank company
had ten platforms mounted with an AT-11 ATGM and six
missiles, capable of engaging and destroying vehicles at
4.0 KM.  The infantry company had 12 platforms armed with
an AT-5 ATGM and four wire-guided missiles, also effective
to 4.0 KM; additionally, each BMP-2 incorporated a 30mm
machine gun with 500 rounds.  Each of the companies
initiated their attack outside the effective range of the
Blue Force, advancing in a pre-battle formation, and
transitioning to a battle formation upon contact, stopping
only to fire their weapon(s), and then continuing movement. 
Each threat vehicles followed a pre-designated axis of
advance until all of the Blue or Red platforms were
destroyed.
1. Scenario I
The first scenario was conducted on terrain
representative of the Balkans region.  It consists of areas
with significant elevation and vegetation, bordered by
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intermittent open areas and valleys with streams and
rivers.  There are several major urban areas as depicted by
the yellow and white regions.  The Blue force is
established in a defensive position overlooking several
major routes leading into and out of one of the large urban
areas.  The western-most, or left, platoon is oriented on
both the open area and potential avenues leading to the
flanks of the company position.  The central platoon is
solely oriented on the major open area and routes leading
to the city, while the eastern-most or right platoon is
focused both on supporting the central platoon and on
potential avenues coming out of the mountains.

Figure 12.   Janus Display of Scenario I – Balkans

The Red force is deployed into three companies,
attacking in pre-battle formation cross-country.  As the
central Red Force clears the urban area, it begins to
deploy into battle formation.  The western-most or left,
Red company is attacking both in the open area and in the
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west, trying to expose the Blue force flank.  The eastern-
most Red company is the battalion reserve, and attacks once
both of the other Red companies are committed and a
potential weakness in the Blue force’s defense is exposed.  
2. Scenario II
The second scenario was conducted on terrain
representative of Southwest Asia (SWA).  The terrain is
extremely wide open, has several major routes throughout
the sector, and is characterized by very few key terrain
features.  With the exception of inter-visibility lines
throughout the area, line of sight is unrestricted for
several kilometers. The Blue force is again deployed in
sector in platoon battle positions, forming a U-shaped
ambush designed to protect a series of key intersections on
major avenues of approach to the rear of the Blue force
defense.  Each platoon is deployed along inter-visibility
lines with partial or full defilade capability, and has
overlapping fields of fire with its adjacent unit to ensure
complete coverage of the engagement area.  
The Red force is attacking as a combined arms force in
echelon with two companies abreast and one in trail as the
reserve.  The Red battalion has deployed two combat
reconnaissance patrols consisting of two BMP-2s and one T-
72 each to identify the Blue force positions.  The
southern-most company has a two-vehicle section of BMP-2s
in order to penetrate or bypass the Blue force’s southern




Figure 13.   Janus Display of Scenario II - SWA 

3. Scenario III
The third and final scenario was conducted in terrain
representative of Eastern Europe.  The terrain is
characterized by rolling hills, extensive vegetation,
streams, rivers, and extensive road networks.  This close,
compartmented terrain was also used by the PEO-TM and CM
Project Office in support of the program’s Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA).  The Blue force company is deployed in
sector in platoon battle positions, defending key river
crossing sites against the Red force.  Each platoon is
responsible for defending one key crossing site, but also
shares overlapping fires with the adjacent platoons to
shift and provide support if necessary.  The Blue force is
maximizing the line-of-sight capability provided by the
river and the adjacent open area, but this close,
compartmented terrain does not support the maximum
effective ranges of either the TOW 2B or CM weapon system.
 63
The Red force is attacking to seize the river crossing
sites with three companies abreast.  The close,
compartmented terrain does not support transition to battle
formation or cross-country maneuver, so each company is
deploying in a staggered column on various routes going in
various directions in an attempt to confuse the Blue force
as to the main thrust of the attack.  

Figure 14.   Janus Display of Scenario III - Europe

E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS OVERVIEW
Three MOEs were selected as the basis for analyzing
the data produced by both the Coroner’s Report and the
Engagement Analysis Report from the Janus Post Processor
files.  Specifically, an MOE is defined as:
A quantifiable measure used in comparing systems
or concepts or estimating the contribution of a
system or concept to the effectiveness of a
military force. It expresses the extent to which
a combat system accomplishes or supports a
military mission. [Ref. 14: p. 28]
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1. MOE I:  Lethality
The CM is envisioned to possess lethality that is
equal to or greater than the TOW 2B missile system.  The
capability to defeat the most advanced, heavily-armored
threats has been designated a potential KPP. [Ref. 6]
Subsequently, the MOE for lethality is defined by the
following measure:
• Lethality – The total number of threat platforms
destroyed by each missile system in the base and
alternate cases of each scenario.
2. MOE II:  Survivability
The SBCT was designed as a medium-weight force to
support the power projection capability of the U.S. Army. 
Given the lesser amount of armor protection available on
the Stryker platform as compared to an M1A1 Abrams tank or
M2/M3 Bradley/Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, the degree to which
each missile system contributes to platform and force
survivability is a critical issue.  Therefore, the MOE for
survivability is defined by the following measure:
• Survivability – The total number of Stryker AT
platforms destroyed by threat platforms in the
base and alternate cases of each scenario.
3. MOE III:  Engagement Range
The CM is envisioned to provide friendly forces
increased stand-off range in both an air-ground capability
and a ground-ground capability.  Increased stand-off range
is defined as the capability to engage threat systems
outside of their weapon’s capability.  The ability to
engage at greater distances also incorporates the
capability to detect and identify threat forces at greater
ranges.  The Engagement Range Analysis Report produced by
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Janus measures both the average distance at which threat
platforms were destroyed, as well as the average distance
threat platforms were fired upon.  Subsequently, this MOE
has two components and is defined from both perspectives by
the following measures:
• Engagement Range, Part (a) (Kills) - The average
range threat platforms were destroyed at by each
missile system in the base and alternate cases of
each scenario.
• Engagement Range, Part (b) (Engagements) - The
average range threat platforms were fired upon by
each missile system in the base and alternate
cases of each scenario.

F. END-OF-BATTLE ANALYSIS OVERVIEW
In addition to analyzing the three MOEs, a separate
component of analysis applied end-of-battle criteria to
each simulation run in the base and alternate cases of each
scenario.  Using these criteria, an average run from both
the base and alternate cases of each scenario was selected
and analyzed using a scatter-plot graph.  The resulting
scatter-plots clearly display for each missile system the
distribution of shots and kills as a function of range over
time.  This analysis will further assist in determining the
potential for increased operational effectiveness of the CM




The purpose of this chapter is to present the raw data
to be analyzed in Chapter V.  Each of the following tables
presents the raw data per MOE, by scenario, as it
corresponds to each simulation run.  In support of MOE I –
Lethality, Table 3 presents the total number of threat
(Red) platforms destroyed in each scenario.  In support of
MOE II – Survivability, Table 4 presents the total number
of friendly (Blue) platforms destroyed in each scenario. 
Finally, Tables 5 and 6 present the raw data necessary to
evaluate both components of MOE III – Engagement Range
Analysis.  Table 5 presents the average range of enemy
platforms destroyed per scenario, per missile system, while
Table 6 presents the average engagement range enemy













A.  MOE I – LETHALITY DATA

TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM
1 24 32 20 32 20 29
2 24 32 20 32 24 32
3 19 31 28 32 15 30
4 20 32 27 32 19 29
5 27 32 14 32 17 29
6 26 32 10 32 19 30
7 21 32 18 32 19 29
8 11 32 17 32 11 28
9 21 31 22 32 11 31
10 28 32 26 32 13 32
11 19 32 20 32 11 30
12 21 32 23 32 11 29
13 12 31 21 32 19 29
14 23 31 30 32 13 32
15 13 32 21 32 21 29
16 21 32 25 32 12 31
17 21 32 17 32 15 30
18 13 32 20 32 19 29
19 26 32 21 32 24 29
20 18 32 21 32 24 28
21 18 32 14 32 11 29
22 17 30 18 32 17 30
23 26 31 18 32 11 29
24 28 32 10 32 24 28
25 11 31 20 32 19 30
Run # Southwest Asia Eastern EuropeBalkans



















B. MOE II – SURVIVABILITY DATA

TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM
1 7 1 9 0 6 3
2 7 0 7 0 4 0
3 8 0 6 3 8 2
4 6 1 6 2 5 1
5 4 1 9 2 5 2
6 6 0 9 2 6 1
7 6 1 8 0 6 1
8 9 1 9 2 7 2
9 6 0 6 0 7 2
10 5 1 8 0 8 1
11 8 1 9 0 7 2
12 6 0 8 0 9 3
13 8 1 8 3 5 0
14 7 2 6 1 8 1
15 7 1 7 1 5 0
16 6 0 9 1 7 0
17 7 1 9 1 8 2
18 7 0 9 2 5 0
19 6 2 7 0 4 1
20 9 0 8 2 2 3
21 8 1 9 2 7 3
22 8 3 8 2 5 2
23 6 0 8 2 7 0
24 5 1 9 2 4 3
25 9 1 9 1 8 2
Run # Southwest Asia Eastern EuropeBalkans



















C.  MOE III - ENGAGEMENT RANGE ANALYSIS DATA

1. Part (a) – Average Kill Range

TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM
1 2.982 4.012 3.037 4.110 2.870 3.898
2 3.019 3.839 2.761 4.154 2.908 3.896
3 2.921 3.978 3.071 4.129 2.956 3.640
4 2.889 4.063 2.972 3.972 2.997 3.437
5 3.141 4.136 2.899 3.994 3.059 3.792
6 2.959 4.061 3.106 4.162 2.897 3.546
7 3.016 4.114 2.694 4.137 3.132 4.021
8 3.137 4.081 3.041 4.162 2.826 3.894
9 3.016 4.094 2.907 4.110 2.956 3.465
10 3.032 4.057 2.993 4.186 2.971 3.704
11 2.946 4.063 3.037 4.223 2.826 3.398
12 3.016 4.051 2.909 4.137 2.993 3.898
13 2.943 4.168 2.818 4.129 2.787 3.747
14 3.015 3.980 2.983 3.966 2.971 3.704
15 3.143 3.930 2.953 3.898 2.824 3.916
16 3.016 4.061 3.016 4.156 2.793 3.644
17 3.102 4.041 3.041 4.156 2.956 3.628
18 3.143 4.117 3.042 3.972 2.787 3.747
19 2.959 4.100 2.953 4.137 2.908 4.060
20 3.002 4.117 2.818 4.201 2.909 4.017
21 3.118 4.081 2.899 4.201 2.826 3.898
22 2.865 4.168 2.630 4.225 3.059 3.571
23 2.956 3.838 2.694 4.371 2.956 3.916
24 3.032 4.031 3.106 4.371 2.908 4.017
25 3.137 4.172 3.037 4.089 2.721 3.628
Eastern Europe
Average Kill Range
Balkans Southwest AsiaRun #













2. Part (b) – Average Engagement Range

TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM TOW 2B CM
1 3.004 4.031 3.092 4.194 3.052 3.947
2 3.111 3.964 3.077 4.259 3.124 4.012
3 2.968 3.956 3.200 4.325 2.997 3.700
4 2.981 4.146 3.128 4.031 2.989 3.537
5 3.202 4.023 3.140 4.152 3.124 3.866
6 2.978 4.128 3.293 4.272 2.820 3.665
7 3.156 4.276 3.016 4.236 3.175 4.116
8 3.268 4.064 3.240 4.272 3.025 3.818
9 3.156 4.137 3.013 4.194 2.564 3.647
10 3.032 4.199 3.080 4.278 2.636 3.815
11 3.029 4.146 3.092 4.313 3.025 3.628
12 3.156 4.173 2.986 4.236 2.928 3.947
13 3.000 4.299 3.014 4.325 2.809 3.768
14 3.089 4.080 3.187 4.139 2.636 3.815
15 3.258 4.046 3.126 4.017 2.973 4.057
16 3.156 4.128 3.005 4.272 2.765 3.871
17 3.100 4.157 3.240 4.272 2.997 3.679
18 3.258 4.111 3.248 4.031 2.809 3.768
19 2.978 4.107 3.126 4.236 3.124 4.088
20 3.062 4.111 3.014 4.387 2.941 4.008
21 3.108 4.064 3.140 4.387 3.025 3.947
22 2.980 4.100 2.923 4.290 3.124 3.669
23 3.068 3.991 3.016 4.495 2.564 4.057
24 3.032 4.120 3.293 4.495 3.124 4.008
25 3.268 4.226 3.092 4.257 2.746 3.679
Run # Balkans
Average Engagement Range
Southwest Asia Eastern Europe
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V. DATA ANALYSIS
The purpose of this research effort is to determine
the potential increase in operational effectiveness within
the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) of the CM system
over the TOW 2B missile system.  This analysis includes the
three MOEs and additional data characteristics that
holistically provide additional depth from which to derive
conclusions and recommendations.  The first part of the
analysis will encompass the statistical analysis of the
data sets for each MOE as presented in Chapter IV, while
the subsequent analysis will review and analyze the
application of the end-of-battle criteria.   

A. DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
In order to effectively compare the data generated by
Janus for each MOE, a statistical add-in for Microsoft
Excel, called Analyse-it, was used in order to graphically
compare the results of each base and alternate case within
each scenario.  The post processor reports from Janus
generated the data tables within Chapter IV, which were
then entered into Excel spreadsheets in order to use the
Analyse-it application.  This Excel add-in uses descriptive
statistics to analyze the data in terms of mean, standard
deviation, parametric range, median, inter-quartile range,
outliers, and confidence intervals.  Specifically, for this
research effort, comparative continuous descriptive
statistics were analyzed.  Per the Analyse-it software
index, these statistics are used “…to indicate the central
tendency and the scatter/dispersion of the observations. 
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Vertical box-whisker plots are shown side-by-side for easy
comparison of differences between the variables.” [Ref. 1] 
The box-whisker plots depict both parametric and non-
parametric comparative descriptive statistics.  As seen in
Figure 15, the blue diamond depicts the mean of the data
and the specified confidence interval, which was 95% in all
cases.  The blue line with notches on both ends depicts the
specified parametric percentile range.  




Figure 15.   Parametric Statistics Legend [Ref. 1]

The non-parametric statistics legend is depicted in
Figure 16.  The notched box depicts the median, lower and
upper quartiles, and the specified confidence interval
around the median, which was 95% in all cases.  The nearest
observations within 1.5 of the inter-quartile ranges (IQRs)
are depicted with a dotted line.  Possible outliers between
1.5 and 3.0 IQRs are depicted with red crosses, while
outliers greater than 3.0 IQRs away are indicated with a
red circle.  Lastly, the blue vertical lines depict the
specified non-parametric percentile range.    
Nearest observations w ithin 1.5 IQ Rs
Non-param etric percentile range
M edian
Confidence interval o f m edian
Interquartile range, upper/low er quartile
Near outliers, betw een 1.5 and 3.0 IQ Rs aw ay 
Far outliers, over 3.0 IQ Rs aw ay 
Figure 16.   Non-Parametric Statistics Legend [Ref. 1]
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B. MOE I – LETHALITY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The lethality measure of effectiveness is defined as
the total number of Red kills within the base and alternate
cases of each scenario.  The box-whisker plot for this MOE
is depicted in Figure 17, which graphically depicts the
performance of each missile system within each scenario. 
While the performance of each missile system is fairly
consistent in all three scenarios, the number of Red
vehicles destroyed by the CM is clearly increased versus
the TOW 2B.  In the Southwest Asia (SWA) CM scenario, 32
out of 32 Red vehicles were destroyed in each of the 25
runs.  Due to a software limitation, Analyse-it could not
display the descriptive statistics due to this lack of
standard deviation in Red kills.  To correct for this, the
value of 31.999, instead of 32, was manually entered into
Run 1 of the SWA CM scenario, which then facilitated the
computation of the statistical analysis.  This explains the
outlier depicted in that case.  The remaining outliers
normally occurred as seen per the data in Chapter IV.








Balkans - TOW 2B Balkans - CM Southw est Asia -
TOW 2B




Eastern Europe - CM











Figure 17.   Comparative Box-Whisker Plots for MOE I -
Lethality
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Closer analysis of the descriptive statistics in Table
7 indicates that the greatest improvement of the CM over
the TOW 2B is in the Eastern Europe scenario with a 78%
increase in the mean Red kills.  The SWA scenario was
second best with a 60% improvement in the mean, while the
Balkans scenario had a 56% improvement.  Concurrently, the
median percentage improvement was 71% for the Eastern
European scenario, 60% for SWA, and 52% for the Balkans
scenario.  As shown below in Table 7, the standard
deviation and inter-quartile range for the CM is much
smaller than that of the TOW 2B, which is indicative of the
CM’s high level of predictability in achieving the mean or
median number of Red kills.   
Terrain / Missile n Mean SD 95% CI of Mean Median IQR 95% CI of Median
Balkans - TOW 2B 25 20.320 5.2893 18.137 to 22.503 21.000 6.000 18.000 to 24.000
Balkans - CM 25 31.680 0.5568 31.450 to 31.910 32.000 1.000 32.000 to 32.000
Southwest Asia - TOW 2B 25 20.040 4.9706 17.988 to 22.092 20.000 4.000 18.000 to 21.000
Southwest Asia - CM 25 32.000 0.0000 32.000 to 32.000 32.000 0.000 32.000 to 32.000
Eastern Europe - TOW 2B 25 16.760 4.6751 14.830 to 18.690 17.000 7.000 13.000 to 19.000
Eastern Europe - CM 25 29.640 1.1860 29.150 to 30.130 29.000 1.000 29.000 to 30.000 
Table 7.   Descriptive Statistics for MOE I - Lethality

C. MOE II - SURVIVABILITY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The survivability measure of effectiveness is defined
as the total number of Blue platforms destroyed by threat
platforms in the base and alternate cases of each scenario. 
This particular MOE is also affected by the use of full and
partial defilade vehicle positions, which contributed to
each platform’s survivability.  Per Figure 18, the CM is
clearly depicted as contributing to increased survivability
for the friendly forces in each scenario as compared to the
TOW 2B.  The largest number of Blue platforms destroyed in
any CM scenario was three platforms, one of which is
depicted as an outlier in the Balkan scenario.  Both the
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graphical and descriptive statistics indicate that the TOW
2B lost an average of six or more platforms in each
scenario, which is at least two platoons or two-thirds of
the AT company’s combat power. Conversely, the mean number
of Blue platforms lost in the CM scenarios ranged from 0.8
to 1.5.  Graphically, the greatest dispersion between the
TOW 2B and the CM appears to be in the SWA scenario, while
the least dispersion appears to be in the Eastern European
scenario.  This is attributable to the engagement range of
both missile systems in each scenario.  The CM was able to
maximize its engagement range capability in SWA due to the
open terrain, which indirectly contributed to the increase
in Blue survivability.  The differences between the TOW 2B
and CM were less in Eastern Europe, as engagement ranges
were confined to the close, complex nature of the terrain,
and the loss of Blue platforms was therefore greater as
compared to the other two scenarios. 








Balkans - TOW 2B Balkans - CM Southw est Asia -
TOW 2B




Eastern Europe - CM












Figure 18.   Comparative Box-Whisker Plots for MOE II –
Survivability

An examination of the descriptive statistics also
reveals significant improvement in survivability for the
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Blue platforms equipped with the CM.  The largest percent
decrease in Blue losses was reflected in the Balkans
scenario, with an 88% improvement over the TOW 2B.  This
was followed by SWA with an 85% mean improvement, and
lastly the Eastern European scenario had a 76% mean
improvement.  The median percentage decrease in Blue losses
followed a similar pattern with an 86% improvement for the
Balkans scenario, an 88% improvement for the SWA scenario
and a 67% improvement for the Eastern European scenario. 
These overall percentage decreases in Blue losses translate
directly to a significant increase in survivability.  
Terrain / Missile n Mean SD 95% CI of Mean Median IQR 95% CI of Median
Balkans - TOW 2B 25 6.840 1.3128 6.298 to 7.382 7.000 2.000 6.000 to 8.000
Balkans - CM 25 0.800 0.7638 0.485 to 1.115 1.000 1.000 0.000 to 1.000
Southwest Asia - TOW 2B 25 8.000 1.1180 7.538 to 8.462 8.000 2.000 8.000 to 9.000
Southwest Asia - CM 25 1.240 1.0116 0.822 to 1.658 1.000 2.000 0.000 to 2.000
Eastern Europe - TOW 2B 25 6.120 1.6912 5.422 to 6.818 6.000 2.000 5.000 to 7.000
Eastern Europe - CM 25 1.480 1.0847 1.032 to 1.928 2.000 1.000 1.000 to 2.000 
Table 8.   Descriptive Statistics for MOE II - Survivability

D. MOE III – ENGAGEMENT RANGE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The engagement range measure of effectiveness is
divided into two components:  1) Engagement Range, Part (a)
(Kills) are the average range threat platforms were
destroyed by each missile system in the base and alternate
cases of each scenario; and 2) Engagement Range, Part (b)
(Engagements) are the average range threat platforms were
fired upon by each missile system in the base and alternate
cases of each scenario.  For the purpose of this analysis,
these components were examined separately.
1. Engagement Range Analysis, Part (a) (Kills)
The CM displayed a significant increase over the TOW
2B mean and median kill ranges throughout all three
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scenarios, as displayed in Figure 19.  The CM shows
significant increase in average kill range over that of the
TOW 2B in both the Balkans and SWA scenarios, but less of
an increase in the Eastern Europe scenario.  This is
attributable to the line-of-sight and engagement range
capabilities of the CM.  The CM attempted to take full
advantage of its six-kilometer engagement range capability
in SWA due to few terrain features or other natural
impediments; however, it was limited to the inter-
visibility characteristics of the SWA terrain.  As
introduced in Chapter III, inter-visibility lines limit
line-of-sight capability in apparently open terrain that is
actually rolling or gently sloping.  While the terrain
depicted is characterized by contour lines at specific
intervals, certain areas that appeared to be open did not
have line-of-sight capability.    



























Figure 19.   Comparative Box-Whisker Plots for MOE III(a) –
Engagement Range (Kills)

The outliers depicted in the SWA CM scenario can be
attributed to these SWA terrain inter-visibility
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characteristics, behind which the Red forces were able to
maximize the opportunity to mask their movement.  The
outlier in the TOW 2B SWA scenario can also be attributed
to inter-visibility.  On the other hand, both the TOW 2B
and the CM were severely restricted in Eastern Europe due
to the close, complex terrain with little opportunity for
long range shots.  This restriction is reflected in the
graph above, which depicts a greater variability in the
engagement range for both missile systems in the Eastern
European scenario.  
The descriptive statistics per Table 9 confirm the
mean and median improvement of the CM over the TOW 2B.  In
the Balkans scenario, the CM had a 34% increase over the
TOW 2B in the mean engagement range for kills, a 41%
increase in SWA, and a 29% increase in Eastern Europe. 
Table 9 below indicates a greater standard deviation and
inter-quartile range for the CM and the TOW 2B in Eastern
Europe when compared to the other two scenarios.  This is
indicative of how the limited long-range capabilities
inherent in the Eastern European terrain affected the
predictability of the average engagement range in this
scenario. 
Terrain / Missile n Mean SD 95% CI of Mean Median IQR 95% CI of Median
Balkans - TOW 2B 25 3.0202 0.08284 2.9860 to 3.0544 3.0160 0.1430 2.9590 to 3.0320
Balkans - CM 25 4.0541 0.08794 4.0178 to 4.0904 4.0630 0.0830 4.0410 to 4.1000
Southwest Asia - TOW 2B 25 2.9367 0.13341 2.8816 to 2.9918 2.9720 0.1380 2.8990 to 3.0370
Southwest Asia - CM 25 4.1339 0.11225 4.0876 to 4.1803 4.1370 0.0760 4.1100 to 4.1620
Eastern Europe - TOW 2B 25 2.9118 0.09874 2.8711 to 2.9526 2.9080 0.1450 2.8260 to 2.9560
Eastern Europe - CM 25 3.7633 0.19434 3.6831 to 3.8435 3.7470 0.2700 3.6400 to 3.8980 







2. Engagement Range Analysis, Part (b) (Engagements)
As compared to the analysis of Part (a) above, the
engagement range analysis for Part (b) depicts similar
findings both graphically and statistically.  Per Figure
20, the CM clearly engaged at a much longer range than that
of the TOW 2B in all three scenarios.  The greatest
disparity between the two missile systems is in the SWA
scenario, with the CM engaging the threat at an average of
4.25 kilometers, as compared to the TOW 2B engaging at an
average of 3.11 kilometers, a difference of approximately
1.1 kilometers.  Both the CM and the TOW 2B depict little
variation around the mean and median in the Balkans and SWA
scenarios, but there is significant variation around the
mean and median for both missile systems in the Eastern
Europe scenario.  As in Part (a), this variation is
attributed to the terrain limitations of the Eastern Europe
scenario, where neither missile system had the ability to
engage at their maximum range capability with any
consistency.


























Analysis of the parametric statistics in Table 10
reveals that the CM had a 33% increase in the mean
engagement range in the Balkans scenario, a 37% increase in
the SWA scenario, and a 31% increase in the Eastern Europe
scenario.  There was also a 33% increase in the median for
the CM over the TOW 2B in the Balkans scenario, 38%
increase in SWA, and 28% increase in Eastern Europe.  As in
the engagement range analysis for kills, the CM shows a
distinct improvement over the TOW 2B in the average range
at which a missile was fired against a threat vehicle. 
Terrain / Missile n Mean SD 95% CI of Mean Median IQR 95% CI of Median
Balkans - TOW 2B 25 3.0959 0.10020 3.0546 to 3.1373 3.0890 0.1520 3.0290 to 3.1560
Balkans - CM 25 4.1113 0.08593 4.0759 to 4.1468 4.1110 0.0820 4.0640 to 4.1460
Southwest Asia - TOW 2B 25 3.1112 0.10130 3.0694 to 3.1531 3.0920 0.1710 3.0160 to 3.1400
Southwest Asia - CM 25 4.2546 0.12174 4.2043 to 4.3048 4.2720 0.1190 4.2360 to 4.2900
Eastern Europe - TOW 2B 25 2.9238 0.18785 2.8463 to 3.0014 2.9890 0.2430 2.8090 to 3.0250
Eastern Europe - CM 25 3.8445 0.16718 3.7755 to 3.9135 3.8180 0.3290 3.7000 to 3.9470 




As first introduced in Chapter III, the end-of-battle
analysis was conducted to further assess the operational
effectiveness of the CM as compared to the TOW 2B.  This
section will first describe the methodology used to apply
the end-of-battle criteria and subsequently analyze the
results for each scenario.
1. End-of-Battle Analysis Methodology 
The purpose of the end-of-battle analysis is to
graphically depict the distribution of shots and kills as a
function of range over time for both missile systems.  One
representative run from both the base and alternate cases
in each scenario was used to create a scatter-plot graph
from the raw data in an Excel spreadsheet.  To determine a
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representative run from the base and alternate cases in
each scenario, end-of-battle criteria was assumed to be 25%
Blue losses (or three Blue platforms destroyed) or 30% Red
losses (or ten Red platforms destroyed), whichever came
first in each of the 25 simulations in each base and
alternate case.  These percentages were used based upon
both guidance from PEO-Tactical Missiles and previous
modeling and simulation efforts conducted for the CM. 
[Ref. 27]  Once the end-of-battle criteria were applied to
the 25 simulation runs in each case, the end-of-battle run
times were averaged.  The simulation run with the closest
end-of-battle game time to this average was used as a
representative run for that particular case.  In each case,
the Blue forces achieved end-of-battle criteria first by
destroying ten Red platforms.  The shots and kills data
from the Engagement Range Analysis Post Processing Reports
were input into the Excel spreadsheet and a scatter-plot
graph was then created.  Each scatter-plot graphically
portrays the base and alternate case representative runs by
scenario. The maximum effective ranges for each missile
system are indicated with a blue horizontal line at 3.5
kilometers for the TOW 2B and a red horizontal line at six
kilometers for the CM.  Additionally, a vertical blue line
indicates the end-of-battle time for the TOW 2B, and a
vertical red line represents the end-of-battle time for the
CM.  
2. Scenario I End-of-Battle Analysis
For Scenario I - Balkans, Run 6 was selected as the
representative run for the TOW 2B base case, while Run 14
was selected for the CM alternate case.  The resulting
scatter-plot is seen in Figure 21.  The end-of-battle time
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for the TOW 2B was determined to be 13 minutes and 41
seconds (13:41), while the CM end-of-battle time was 11:49,
which is a difference of just under two minutes.  The graph
clearly displays a high concentration of shots and kills
for the CM occurring much earlier in the run than those of
the TOW 2B, with virtually every engagement over 3.5
kilometers.  If the one CM shot and one kill that occurred
at the end-of-battle time were eliminated, the resulting
end-of-battle time for the CM would have been under ten
minutes, with a difference of just over four minutes.  The
overall trends in the graph depict that the CM reached end-
of-battle quicker and at a greater range than the TOW 2B,
whose shots and kills are much more dispersed over a longer
period of time and at less range.  However, the TOW 2B was
capable of engaging and destroying threat targets at its
maximum effective range of 3.5 kilometers consistently
throughout the run, while in its run the majority of CM’s






























































Figure 21.   End-of-Battle Scatter-plot for Scenario I –
Balkans
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3. Scenario II End-of-Battle Analysis
For Scenario II – SWA, Run 23 was selected as the
representative run for the TOW 2B base case, while Run 22
was selected for the CM alternate case, with the resulting
scatter-plot displayed in Figure 22.  The most noticeable
pattern is the lack of shots and kills between 19 and 25
minutes.  This is most likely due to the doctrinal
employment of the Red force.  The reconnaissance element
was comprised of six vehicles that were initially destroyed
in each case, and is indicated by the first groupings of
shots and kills.  The main body was comprised of 26
platforms, of which only four more had to be destroyed in
































































Figure 22.   End-of-Battle Scatter-plot for Scenario II – SWA

The end-of-battle time for the TOW 2B was determined to be
29:59, while the CM end-of-battle time was 27:47, which is
a difference of just over two minutes.  The primary reason
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for the different time scale in the SWA scatter-plot is due
to the increased distance the threat travels in the
scenario prior to engaging the Blue force. 
The shots and kills for the CM are again consistently
between four and five kilometers, with only two shots and
one kill occurring at less than two kilometers.  This is
also attributable to the inter-visibility characteristics
of the SWA terrain, which the Red forces utilized to mask
their movement.  The TOW 2B had several shots in excess of
three kilometers, but overall, the shots and kills were
dispersed between two and 3.5 kilometers.  
4. Scenario III End-of-Battle Analysis
For Scenario III – Eastern Europe, Run 6 was selected
as the representative run for the TOW 2B base case, while
Run 18 was selected for the CM alternate case.   Figure 23
depicts the resulting scatter-plot.  The end-of-battle time
for the TOW 2B was determined to be 17:43, while the CM
end-of-battle time was 15:31, which is again a difference
of just over two minutes.  Due to the close, complex nature
of the Eastern Europe terrain, the CM shots and kills
occurred mostly between eight to 15 minutes, with the TOW































































Figure 23.   End-of-Battle Scatter-plot for Scenario III –
Eastern Europe

The majority of the CM shots are tightly concentrated
between 3.5 to nearly five kilometers, while the TOW 2B
shots/kills are mostly concentrated between 2.5 and 3.5
kilometers.  The channeling of the threat onto the complex
road networks afforded both missile systems with only a
narrow opportunity of time to engage and destroy the Red
forces, which further explains the clusters of shots/kills
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Primary Research Question Review
• Within the context of the Stryker ATGM platform
in a Janus simulation, which missile system
provides the most operational effectiveness?
In each of the three scenarios modeled within Janus,
the CM displayed significant improvement over the TOW 2B in
all measures of effectiveness – lethality, survivability,
and engagement range capability – as well as in the end-of-
battle analysis.  The percentage increases presented with

























Table 11.   Summary of CM Performance Versus TOW 2B

The greatest improvement is found in MOE II –
Survivability, which ranges from a 76% to 88% improvement
across all three scenarios.  This is a critical aspect that
could provide a significant improvement to the current
capabilities of the SBCT.  The increase in survivability of
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the Stryker ATGM platform equipped with the CM is
attributable to the increased maximum effective range. 
Since the CM was able to engage the threat beyond the
threat’s direct fire capabilities, both platform-level and
force-level survivability was improved for the Blue force. 
The next highest improvement is evidenced in MOE I –
Lethality, with a range of 56%-78% improvement over the TOW
2B across all three scenarios.  Significant improvement was
also seen in both kills and engagements for MOE III –
Engagement Range, ranging from a 29% to 41% improvement.  
The end-of-battle analysis demonstrated the capability
of the CM to engage further and earlier than the TOW 2B in
each of the representative runs presented, thus
strengthening and corroborating the analysis of all three
MOEs.  The capability to engage further and earlier
represents the potential opportunity to maximize the combat
power of the SBCT’s AT company, facilitating its
availability for follow-on missions, while significantly
improving both force and platform survivability.  
2.  Subsidiary Questions Review
• How did the variation of terrain between
scenarios affect the performance of the missile
systems?
While the CM outperformed the TOW 2B in all three
terrain locations, both missile systems were sensitive to
various factors.  One particular advantage the CM possesses
over the TOW 2B is its fire-and-forget capability, which
allowed the system to engage and immediately re-occupy its
defilade position.  Conversely, the wire-guided command
guidance system of the TOW 2B required the Blue platform to
remain exposed until the TOW missile reached its target. 
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This difference was a critical factor in the performance of
each missile system in each terrain, especially in the
scenarios characterized by significant terrain features;
this factor also impacts both force and platform
survivability.  
In SWA, both missile systems were able to engage at or
near their maximum effective ranges, facilitating a greater
number of Red kills compared to the other scenarios.  The
only factor restricting either missile system in SWA was
the presence of inter-visibility lines, which limited their
line-of-sight and detection capabilities.  In the Balkans
scenario, the significant terrain features channeled the
threat into a well-defined engagement area, in which the
Blue force was able to concentrate their fires by employing
both missile systems.  Additionally, the urban and
intermittent open areas facilitated the establishment of a
comprehensive Blue force defense.  The Eastern Europe
scenario limited both missile systems due to the close,
complex nature of the terrain.  This factor limited
detection and engagement capabilities, resulting in fewer
Red kills and higher Blue losses compared to the other two
scenarios.  This was especially detrimental for the TOW 2B
and its wire-guided command system, leaving the Blue
platform exposed until the missile impacted the target.
• What are the specific advantages of employing the
CM system rather than the TOW 2B within the SBCT
AT company?
The demonstrated performance advantage of the CM over
the TOW 2B in this research effort supports the conclusion
that the CM will bring increased force effectiveness to
both the SBCT and the AT company.  As modeled, the extended
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engagement range, fire-and-forget capability, and increased
lethality of the CM comprise three technological advantages
that clearly overmatch the TOW 2B.  As the primary long-
range anti-armor element of the SBCT, these increased
capabilities will greatly contribute to increased force and
platform survivability.  
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to provide value-added additional research
for the CM program, all of the model inputs should be
replaced with the actual classified data to enhance the
results of this effort and other projects, and to
strengthen the requirement for the CM system.  
From an operational perspective, the following
considerations should be implemented into future efforts:
• Additional combat multipliers of the SBCT should
be incorporated into the scenarios.  These
include, but are not limited to, attack aviation,
indirect fire, and other maneuver units.  A
methodology for assessing and measuring
contributions to increased force effectiveness
must be defined and implemented in order to
ascertain the correct force structure and
employment doctrine for each multiplier.
• As one of the key survivability factors for this
brigade is situational awareness and
understanding, this capability must be integrated
into future SBCT modeling efforts.  This is
critical to ensure the timely employment of the
AT company, or other SBCT elements, in an
operational environment representative of that in
which the SBCT will operate.
From a modeling perspective, the following
considerations for Janus include:
• Model the SBCT, AT company, and CM in varied
force structures on different terrain locations,
with a different mix of threat structures and
 92
equipment.  Incorporate emerging technologies
such as reactive armor or other counter-measures
to assess their effect upon the CM.  
• Develop a scenario for the AT company that
incorporates soldiers and officers from one of
the SBCTs for execution with the added
capabilities of the CM.  Allow the “players” to
interactively war-game the scenario in accordance
with established doctrine and standard operating
procedures.
• Develop the capability for the tri-mode seeker
(imaging infrared (I2R), semi-active laser (SAL),
and millimeter wave (MMW)) and multi-mode warhead
in Janus and other combat models.

C. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas for potential further study are
based upon the conclusions of this research effort:
• Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the added
capabilities the CM could offer to the SBCT. 
These include, but are not limited to, an
evaluation of the extended range, lethality, and
fire-and-forget capabilities as they impact upon
the operational and organizational construct of
the SBCT.
• Re-run the model and these scenarios with a
varied force structure to determine the optimum
mix of Stryker ATGM platforms the AT company
should possess.  For example, what would be the
increase in operational effectiveness, as
compared to this research effort, if each platoon
were to have four Stryker ATGM platforms, for a
total of 12 in the AT company?
• Develop and execute a scenario that task
organizes an AT platoon, equipped with the CM,
down to an infantry battalion or the
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron of the SBCT, in order
to assess its operational effectiveness when
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF IAV REQUIREMENTS











1. Operate effectively, day and
night
2. Vehicular intercom system
3. Maximum commonality between
all variants




1. Sustained hard surface speeds
of 40 MPH
2. Climb vertical 18-inch
obstacles
3. Cruising range of 300 miles
4. Capable of fording a water
obstacle
5. Climb and descend hard surface
60% frontal slope with no
degradation in steering
6. Negotiate a hard surface 30%
side slope with no degradation
in steering
7. Capable of crossing gaps
(Approx. ¼ vehicle length)
Survivability
Requirements
1. Dash speed of 50m in less than
8 seconds
2. All around 7.62 protection
3. 14.5mm protection with add-on,
scaleable armor
4. Overhead protection from 152mm
5. All around AP mines protection
6. Universal gun mount that
elevates from –20 to +60o and
traverses 360o 




8. Spall lining to contain/limit 




1. Capable of towing and being
towed; self-recovery
capability
2. NATO slave receptacle and
slave start capability
3. Rapid refueling (NLT 50
gallons per minute) in 4
minutes or less; rapid fuel
transfer
4. Auxiliary power source,





1. Easy access to prime train
power components 
2. Equipped with standard tie-
down and lifting provisions
for air, rail, & sea movement
without shackles
3. Reliability of 1000 mean miles
between critical failures
4. Equipped with built-in test
(BIT) or built-in test
equipment (BITE)
5. If wheeled, must be equipped
with central tire inflation &
run flat tires
6. If tracked, have the capacity
to run short track with a
minimum of one road wheel arm
incapacitated on either side
7. Equipped with interactive
electronic technical manuals
8. Maintenance must use common
tools & not require special
tools not currently available
9. Equipped with lifetime oil
filters, on-board oil
changers, and AC/DC power
generation
10.Utilize standard fuel (JP-8)








1. Able to accomplish OMS/MP
critical functions while in
NBC contaminated environments
and within 15 minutes
following HEMP environments
2. Integrated NBC sensor suite to
provide detection of chemical,
biological agents, and toxic
industrial materials
3. Joint chemical agent alarm





4. Carry on-board items necessary
to conduct immediate and
operational decontamination
procedures within 15 minutes
5. Equipment re-bootable and IAV
re-startable and returned to
full operational capability
within 15 minutes after HEMP
burst
6. Able to host existing and




7. Fire detection and suppression




8. Equipped with a water ration
heater with the same capacity
and capability as those
installed in the M2 ODS and
M2A3 Bradley






ICV KPP Requirement 1. IAV ICV infantry carrier and
engineer squad configurations




1. Capable of hosting mission
equipment packages for all
other configurations
2. Accommodate a minimum of two
crewman with individual
equipment
3. Doors/hatches that facilitate
rapid ingress/egress of
soldiers
4. Provide a squad leader
display for ICV and ESV
applications
5. Provide armament capable of
day/night operation to
ID/defeat enemy troops in the
open & in hastily prepared
fighting positions at 1500m
6. Armament elevation of –20o to
+60o or more
7. Armament system can be fired
mounted/dismounted; capable
in day/night of ID and
defeating light armored
vehicles at 1500m
8. Carry a full basic load of
ammunition for primary and
secondary armament systems
9. Stowed missiles separated
from onboard personnel
10.ICV and RV must enter/exit
water obstacle w/o
preparation and swim
11.All ICV configurations must
carry one standard NATO
litter
12.ICV, ATGM, RV, CV, and FSV
provided with scaleable armor
packages to protect against
14.5mm and HHH up to RPG-7

Table 13.   ICV Requirements [Ref. 23: Annex A, pp. 1-4]
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C. ATGM REQUIREMENTS
ATGM Requirements 1. Based on the ICV variant
2. Capable of integrating TOW
2B and IBAS/ITAS or
equivalent capability
3. Capable of mounting a
minimum of 2 ready missiles
4. Minimum storage of 8
missiles
5. Same armament as the ICV
6. Launcher capable of rapid
reloading by an individual
crewman with minimum
exposure
7. Crew of four





























APPENDIX B. SYSTEMS DATABASE INPUTS
The purpose of this appendix is to present the basic
database parameters that were entered for both the Blue and
Red platforms and systems prior to conducting the
simulations.  All information is unclassified and was
reviewed/approved by PEO-TM prior to executing the
simulation runs.
A. BLUE SYSTEM DATABASE INPUTS
Max Rd Max Wpn Elemt Chem
Speed Visbl Rng Sens Crew Space Xmit Gra Cls Host
Sys Num Sys Name (KM/Hr) (KM) (KM) Hght (m) Size (m) Fctr Sym Sym Cap
80 LAV TOW 70 7.0 6.0 3 4 100 1.0 55 126 1
82 LAV GCM 70 6.0 3.5 3 4 100 1.0 55 126 1
Min Fir Fly Log Mov Rdr Smk Srv Swm
Sys Num Sys Name Lsr Dsg Dsp Eng Typ Cat Typ Typ Typ Typ Dsp Typ Typ
80 LAV TOW 1 4 1 2 2
82 LAV GCM 1 4 1 2 2
DETECT Dimensions
BCIS BCIS
Sys Num Sys Name Lngth Width Hght Prim Alt Defil Popup Type Func
80 LAV TOW 7.20 2.80 3.30 23 23 23 1
82 LAV GCM 7.20 2.80 3.30 23 23 23 1
Sys Num Sys Name Exposed Defilade
80 LAV TOW 1.800 0.500
82 LAV GCM 1.800 0.500
Narrow-to-
Sensor Wide Specral (1,2 = Optical
Number Narrow Wide Factor Band  3,4 = Thermal)
23 15.00 1
2 9.00 15.00 0.60 3
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.000 0.020 11 10.620 0.400
2 3.816 0.030 12 10.950 0.450
3 4.776 0.040 13 11.256 0.500
4 5.400 0.050 14 11.544 0.550
5 7.128 0.100 15 11.814 0.600
6 8.112 0.150 16 12.072 0.650
7 8.814 0.200 17 12.318 0.700
8 9.378 0.250 18 12.792 0.800
9 9.846 0.300 19 13.248 0.900




Optical Sensor Number: 23
SENSOR FIELD of VIEW (FOV) and BAND
BLUE SYSTEMS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
BLUE SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Optical Contrast
BLUE SYSTEMS DETECTION DATA
SENSORS
OPTICAL AND THERMAL CONTRAST DATA
(Meters)
 101
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.225 0.050 11 0.709 0.410
2 0.311 0.075 12 0.750 0.540
3 0.363 0.080 13 0.773 0.600
4 0.407 0.090 14 0.803 0.750
5 0.450 0.100 15 0.833 0.900
6 0.494 0.150 16 0.863 1.050
7 0.539 0.200 17 0.891 1.200
8 0.583 0.250 18 0.919 1.300
9 0.626 0.300 19 0.947 1.400
10 0.668 0.370 20 0.975 2.000
Upload
Relative Absolute Wpn/Ord Basic Time
(1-15) (1-250) Name Load (Minutes)
13 5 TOW 10 2.0
Upload
Relative Absolute Wpn/Ord Basic Time
(1-15) (1-250) Name Load (Minutes)
13 90 CM DF 10 2.0
Lay Aim Reload Rnds / Round
Wpn Wpn Time Time Time Trggr Speed Min.
Num Name (Sec) (Sec) (Sec) Pull (KM/Sec) SSKP
5 TOW 2B 7.0 6.0 5.0 1 1 0.180 5
90 CM DF 6.0 6.0 10.0 1 1 0.400 5
Fire on: 0 = Yes, no restrictions.  1 = Stop, can move before impact.
the Move: 3 = Reduce speed to fire. 2 = Stop, only move after impact.
Critical
Wpn Guidance On-board Altitude
Num Mode Sensor (meters)
5 1
90 2
WEAPONS/ORDNANCE for BLUE SYSTEM CM DF
Wpn/Ord Number
Rel Wpn/Ord to use if Ammo
Expended
(1-15)
WEAPONS/ORDNANCE for BLUE SYSTEM TOW 2B
Wpn/Ord Number
(1-15)
Rel Wpn/Ord to use if Ammo
Expended
Thermal Sensor Number: 2
BLUE WEAPON/ROUND CHARACTERISTICS
   / Reload
Trggr Pulls






















HIT and KILL DATA SET NUMBERS for BLUE WEAPON TOW 2B
Set
PH Data PK Data
Set
HIT and KILL DATA SET NUMBERS for BLUE WEAPON CM DF







Range (m) 500 1313 2125 2938 3750
Posture:
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
Range (m) 500 1313 2125 3500 3750
Posture:
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
Range (m) 500 3000 6000 9000 12000
Posture:
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000



















































Range (m) 500 1313 2125 2938 3750
Posture:
0.59900 0.63310 0.65380 0.66810 0.66400
0.55030 0.56440 0.56980 0.58140 0.57430
0.57500 0.61780 0.63880 0.65650 0.66400
0.55850 0.57780 0.59040 0.59110 0.57430
Range (m) 500 1313 2125 3500 3750
Posture:
0.74800 0.75800 0.76680 0.78290 0.76800
0.74370 0.75390 0.77300 0.79760 0.78460
0.75900 0.76480 0.77150 0.77860 0.76800
0.76170 0.76590 0.77970 0.79200 0.78460
Range (m) 500 3000 6000 9000 12000
Posture:
0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000
0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000
0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000









PROBABILITY of KILL DATA SET:  0100
M/ DF
M/ DH






























B. RED SYSTEM DATABASE INPUTS

Max Rd Max Wpn Elemt Chem
Speed Visbl Rng Sens Crew Space Xmit Gra Cls Host
Sys Num Sys Name (KM/Hr) (KM) (KM) Hght (m) Size (m) Fctr Sym Sym Cap
389 T-72 60 6.0 5.0 2 3 50 1.00 1 122
397 BMP-2 60 6.0 4.0 2 4 100 1.00 2 123 2
Min Fir Fly Log Mov Rdr Smk Srv Swm
Sys Num Sys Name Lsr Dsg Dsp Eng Typ Cat Typ Typ Typ Typ Dsp Typ Typ
389 T-72 3 1 2 3
397 BMP-2 4 1 2 3 1
(Meters) BCIS BCIS
Sys Num Sys Name Lngth Width Hght Prim Alt Defil Popup Type Func
389 T-72 5.48 3.15 2.25 23 37 17 1
397 BMP-2 4.90 2.79 2.02 23 37 17 1




Sensor Wide Specral (1,2 = Optical
Number Narrow Wide Factor Band  3,4 = Thermal)
23 15.00 1
37 4.40 8.80 0.50000 4
17 8.70 1
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST
Sensor Number: 23
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.000 0.020 11 10.620 0.400
2 3.816 0.030 12 10.950 0.450
3 4.776 0.040 13 11.256 0.500
4 5.400 0.050 14 11.544 0.550
5 7.128 0.100 15 11.814 0.600
6 8.112 0.150 16 12.072 0.650
7 8.814 0.200 17 12.318 0.700
8 9.378 0.250 18 12.792 0.800
9 9.846 0.300 19 13.248 0.900
10 10.254 0.350 20 13.686 1.000
RED SYSTEMS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
RED SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Optical Contrast
Thermal Contrast
RED SYSTEMS DETECTION DATA
SENSORS
OPTICAL AND THERMAL CONTRAST DATA
DETECT Dimensions







CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST
Sensor Number: 37
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.260 0.005 11 2.864 0.194
2 0.521 0.009 12 3.125 0.285
3 0.781 0.014 13 3.385 0.430
4 1.042 0.019 14 6.646 0.669
5 1.302 0.027 15 3.906 1.088
6 1.562 0.037 16 4.167 1.871
7 1.823 0.050 17 4.427 3.493
8 2.083 0.069 18 4.688 7.477
9 2.344 0.096 19 4.948 21.750







CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST
Sensor Number: 17
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.000 0.020 11 14.280 0.400
2 5.184 0.030 12 14.728 0.450
3 6.472 0.040 13 15.136 0.500
4 7.304 0.050 14 15.520 0.550
5 9.616 0.100 15 15.880 0.600
6 10.928 0.150 16 16.224 0.650
7 11.872 0.200 17 16.552 0.700
8 12.616 0.250 18 17.184 0.800
9 13.248 0.300 19 17.792 0.900
10 13.792 0.350 20 18.384 1.000
Upload
Relative Absolute Wpn/Ord Basic Time
(1-15) (1-250) Name Load (Minutes)
10 378 AT-11 6 2.0
Upload
Relative Absolute Wpn/Ord Basic Time
(1-15) (1-250) Name Load (Minutes)
1 391 2A42 30mm 500 2.0
3 371 AT-5 4 2.0
Lay Aim Reload Rnds / Round
Wpn Wpn Time Time Time Trggr Speed Min.
Num Name (Sec) (Sec) (Sec) Pull (KM/Sec) SSKP
371 AT-5 7.0 7.0 40.0 1 0.270 5
378 AT-11 6.9 3.0 10.0 1 0.350 5
391 2A42 30mm 8.3 2.7 120.0 5 1.300 5
Fire on: 0 = Yes, no restrictions.  1 = Stop, can move before impact.
the Move: 3 = Reduce speed to fire. 2 = Stop, only move after impact.
Critical
Wpn Guidance On-board Altitude





























WEAPONS/ORDNANCE for RED SYSTEM T-72
Wpn/Ord Number
(1-15)





WEAPONS/ORDNANCE for RED SYSTEM BMP-2
Wpn/Ord Number




   / Reload
BLUE BLUE









HIT and KILL DATA SET NUMBERS for RED WEAPON 2A42 30mm




PH Data PK Data
Set Set










Range (m) 250 1188 2125 3063 4000
Posture:
0.45750 0.45750 0.45750 0.45750 0.45750
0.43830 0.43830 0.43830 0.43880 0.43830
0.91640 0.91640 0.91640 0.91660 0.91640
0.90480 0.90480 0.90480 0.90500 0.90480
0.38260 0.38220 0.37790 0.37640 0.37480
0.36000 0.35960 0.35520 0.35360 0.35200
0.87540 0.87520 0.87210 0.87100 0.86990
0.85410 0.85380 0.85000 0.84870 0.84730
Range (m) 100 1075 2050 3025 4000
Posture:
0.46140 0.46130 0.46070 0.46220 0.46370
0.44770 0.44770 0.44770 0.44860 0.45020
0.91800 0.91790 0.91770 0.91830 0.91890
0.90980 0.90980 0.90950 0.91020 0.91090
0.35120 0.35120 0.35040 0.35210 0.35800
0.32630 0.32630 0.32550 0.32720 0.32880
0.86740 0.86740 0.86690 0.86800 0.86910
0.81590 0.81590 0.81530 0.81660 0.81790
Range (m) 700 1400 2100 2800
Posture:
0.50150 0.27820 0.11330 0.60600 0.03490
0.46780 0.25740 0.10420 0.05530 0.03050
0.99230 0.92890 0.74700 0.54610 0.40100
0.99020 0.91690 0.70530 0.50260 0.36020
0.48250 0.22000 0.07850 0.03600 0.01790
0.44920 0.20270 0.07170 0.03180 0.01670
0.99120 0.89850 0.64250 0.42220 0.27690
0.98830 0.87410 0.59420 0.37920 0.24610
0.50150 0.27820 0.11330 0.60600 0.03490
0.46780 0.25740 0.10420 0.05530 0.03050
0.99230 0.92890 0.74700 0.54610 0.40100
0.99020 0.91690 0.70530 0.50260 0.36020
0.48250 0.22000 0.07850 0.03600 0.01790
0.44920 0.20270 0.07170 0.03180 0.01670
MMEF
MMEH














































MMDH (not used) 

Range (m) 250 1188 2125 3063 4000
Posture:
0.98020 0.97980 0.98080 0.98080 0.98080
0.97860 0.97830 0.97910 0.97910 0.97910
0.98370 0.98330 0.98320 0.98440 0.98440
0.98820 0.98790 0.98780 0.98790 0.98790
0.98970 0.98940 0.99010 0.99010 0.99010
0.98880 0.98860 0.98920 0.98920 0.98920
0.97880 0.97820 0.97820 0.97810 0.97950
0.98170 0.98130 0.98120 0.98120 0.98260
0.98990 0.98950 0.99030 0.99030 0.99030
0.98900 0.98880 0.98940 0.98940 0.98940
0.98520 0.98480 0.98480 0.98580 0.98580
0.98980 0.98940 0.98930 0.98940 0.98940
0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200
0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200
0.22360 0.21620 0.21530 0.23790 0.23760






















Range (m) 100 1075 2050 3025 4000
Posture:
0.97960 0.97960 0.97960 0.97960 0.97970
0.97820 0.97820 0.97820 0.97830 0.97830
0.98310 0.98310 0.98310 0.98310 0.98320
0.98650 0.98650 0.98650 0.98650 0.98650
0.98930 0.98930 0.98920 0.98930 0.98930
0.98870 0.98870 0.98870 0.98880 0.98880
0.97800 0.97800 0.97800 0.97800 0.97810
0.98090 0.98090 0.98090 0.98100 0.98090
0.98940 0.98940 0.98940 0.98940 0.98940
0.98890 0.98890 0.98890 0.98900 0.98890
0.98470 0.98470 0.98470 0.98470 0.98470
0.98810 0.98810 0.98810 0.98810 0.98810
0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200
0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200 0.06200
0.21570 0.21570 0.21540 0.21610 0.21670
0.21300 0.21300 0.21280 0.21340 0.21400
Range (m) 700 1400 2100 2800
Posture:
0.20570 0.22290 0.21100 0.19670 0.20790
0.20590 0.22290 0.20950 0.19870 0.21090
0.09520 0.07480 0.03660 0.00830 0.00130
0.11980 0.09780 0.05830 0.00880 0.00210
0.40580 0.42010 0.42150 0.44040 0.44620
0.40800 0.40000 0.42400 0.44810 0.48380
0.06100 0.05280 0.03970 0.02430 0.01790
0.05960 0.05430 0.04000 0.02530 0.01890
0.40580 0.42010 0.42150 0.44040 0.44620
0.40800 0.42000 0.42400 0.44810 0.48380
0.11810 0.09770 0.06100 0.02880 0.01820
0.14550 0.12310 0.08330 0.02920 0.01920
0.02570 0.02060 0.01020 0.00320 0.00040
0.01960 0.01440 0.00870 0.00420 0.00130
KK EH



































APPENDIX C. SAMPLE POST-PROCESSING REPORTS
The purpose of this appendix is to present examples of
the Coroner’s Report and Engagement Range Analysis Report
produced by Janus.  The Coroner’s Report, depicted below in
Figure 24, displays the victim, killer, location, type
weapon, and range for each shot that resulted in a kill. 
The top portion displays the Blue kills that support MOE II
– Survivability, and the bottom portions displays the Red
kills that support MOE I – Lethality.
                                                      CORONER'S REPORT                                                

                                      Run 01 - 25 of Scenario Number 1 - LAV TOW Balk

                                  SIDE:   1                    RUN NUMBER:   1
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The Engagement Range Analysis report shows the average
kill range for each type of threat platform used in the
scenario.  The top portion of Figure 25 displays the
numbers of T-72s destroyed for Run 1, Scenario I, while the
bottom portion displays the number of shots fired in the
same run.  For the Engagement Range analysis, the kill
ranges of both platform types were averaged to support part
(a) of MOE III, and the engagement ranges of both platform
types were averaged to support part (b) of MOE III.
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